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RECENT DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATING TO
JURISDICTION: A PRIMER AND A
CRITIQUE
DAVID M. COHEN*
The Court of International Trade (the Court) was created by
the Customs Courts Act of 1980.1 One provision of this statute that
confers jurisdiction upon the new court, section 1581 of Title 28 of
the United States Code (section 1581), essentially reiterates, with
some slight modifications, the jurisdiction possessed by the Cus-
toms Court.2 Section 1581, however, also confers on the new court
jurisdiction not previously possessed by the Customs Court. These
new areas of jurisdiction represent the major concern of this
Article.
The Customs Courts Act became effective approximately 3
years ago. The Court's first judicial conference seems to be an ap-
propriate time to evaluate the trends that appear to be evolving in
the course of the Court's interpretation of section 1581. Accord-
ingly, this Article will examine jurisdictional decisions of the Court
and its appellate tribunals made during the period extending from
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and not those of
the Department of Justice.
I Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 11727 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 19 & 28 U.S.C. (1982)). See H. R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18-19, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3729, 3729-30. The Court of International Trade was
created to provide a "comprehensive system of judicial review of civil actions arising from
import transactions." Id. at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3731.
2 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1982) (defining jurisdiction of Customs Court) with 28
U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(c) (1982) (Customs Court's jurisdiction vested in Court of International
Trade). See generally Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International
Trade Under the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 471, 485-90 (1980)
(discussing differences between jurisdiction of the Court under pre-1980 legislation and
under Customs Courts Act).
' See Federal Customs Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Prior to the enactment into law of the Federal
Customs Improvement Act, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals possessed exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the Customs Court, and, after the court had been
superseded, from the Court of International Trade. See 1 P. FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
§ 1581(i) JURISDICTION
January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1983. 4 Such an examination
logically must begin with a survey of the structure of section 1581
and the provisions to which it relates.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF SECTION 1581
Section 1581 is divided into nine subsections, labeled (a)
through (i), each of which specifically confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Court to entertain a particular type of civil action. The
procedural rules for such civil actions are contained in chapter 169
of Title 28 of the United States Code entitled "Court of Interna-
tional Trade Procedure." 5 Each of these procedural provisions is
divided into subsections, each of which, as a general rule, relates to
a comparable subsection of section 1581.6 Thus, the structure of
section 1581 indicates that it consists of nine separate jurisdic-
tional schemes. This structure requires the Court to interpret each
subsection in isolation, as a distinct entity. Frequently, as will be
discussed below, it requires the Court to consider interrelation-
ships between the nine subsections as well. With this background,
it is now possible to consider the various decisions rendered by the
Court in this area during the past 3 years. In addition to the provi-
sions in title 28 relating to the jurisdiction of the Court, most of
INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE § 4A.03 (1983). The Federal Customs Improvement Act abol-
ished the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 122, 96 Stat. 25, 36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 831),
which currently possesses exclusive jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the Court of In-
ternational Trade, id. § 37, 96 Stat. at 37 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295).
' Several decisions discussed in the text were rendered prior to the commencement of
this period. They are discussed in this Article because of their significance.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2631-2647 (1982).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(i) (1982); id. §§ 2631, 2632, 2636, 2637, 2639. For example, §
1581(a) grants the Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction over actions com-
menced to contest the denial of a protest, id. § 1581(a), while § 2631(a) stipulates that only
parties that have previously filed protests pursuant to § 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may
bring such actions, id. § 2631(a). The other provisions of § 1581 have similarly-lettered com-
panion requirements in chapter 169. Compare id. § 1581(a)-(i) (actions over which the court
possesses jurisdiction) with id. § 2631(a)-(i) (standing requirements for § 1581 actions) and
§ 2636(a)-(i) (statutes of limitation for § 1581 actions). Some requirements, however, apply
to all subsections of § 1581, and not just to a specific subsection. For instance, the proce-
dural requirement that a party exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit in the
Court, is generally applicable to § 1581. See id. § 2637(d). Similarly, subdivisions (d)
through (i) of § 1581 are subject to the provision that "[tihe Court of International Trade
may prescribe by rule that any. . . pleading. . . mailed by registered or certified mail...
be deemed filed as of the date of mailing," id. § 2632(d), while actions brought under sub-
sections (a) through (c) of § 1581 are subject to the filing requirements set forth in subsec-
tions (a) through (c) of § 2632, id. § 2632(a)-(c).
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the subsections contained in section 1581 specifically refer to the
Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act)7 and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Tariff
Act).' These statutes contain various limitations on the types of
actions taken by United States agencies that may be challenged by
individuals who may prosecute such challenges.
For example, section 1581(a) grants the Court jurisdiction to
entertain a civil action contesting the denial of a protest of a Cus-
toms Service decision under section 515 of the Tariff Act (section
515). 9 Section 515, in turn, refers to section 514 of the Tariff Act
(section 514), which provides that seven specified types of Customs
Service decisions "shall be final and conclusive upon all persons
(including the United States) unless a protest is filed in accordance
with the section, or a timely civil action contesting the denial of a
protest" is instituted. 10 In accordance with jurisdictional principles
first developed by the Customs Court and followed by the Court of
International Trade, a civil action instituted pursuant to section
1581(a) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless, in addi-
tion to fulfilling all the other jurisdictional prerequisites, the plain-
tiff has filed a protest to one of the seven types of Custom Service
decisions specified in section 514.11
The same principle applies to section 1581(c). This section re-
fers to section 516A of the Tariff Act (section 516A), which sub-
jects certain administrative decisions under the countervailing and
antidumping duty statutes to judicial review. 2 If a civil action in-
stituted pursuant to section 1581(c) does not challenge one of the
stipulated types of administrative decisions, the Court must find
that it does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the action pursu-
ant to section 1581(c).' 3
• 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982).
8 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677 (1982).
19 U.S.C. § 1515 (1982).
'0 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1982).
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a), 2632-2647 (1982); see also United States v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
687 F.2d 467, 474-75 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (no jurisdiction where appellee failed to protest denial
of demand for duties or imposition of damages as required by statute); Wear Me Apparel
Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 818 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981) (failure to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing protest resulted in denial of jurisdiction under § 1581(a)
and § 1581(i)).
1 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982).
'3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982); see, e.g., Royal Business Machs., Inc. v. United
States, 669 F.2d 692, 698-99 & n.13 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (dismissal by Court of International
Trade affirmed because appellant's failure to commence action within period required by 19
U.S.C. § 1516a precluded availability of jurisdiction under § 1581(c)); but cf. Sacilor,
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Some of the jurisdictional questions posed by section 1581 in-
volve the concept of sovereign immunity. The United States, of
course, is not subject to suit unless it has waived its sovereign im-
munity, and any act purporting to waive sovereign immunity must
be strictly construed. 14 This principle affects the interpretation of
the interrelationships among the various subsections of section
1581.
Thus, the structure of section 1581 indicates that it consists of
nine separate jurisdictional schemes. This structure requires the
court to interpret each subsection in isolation, as a distinct entity.
Frequently, as will be discussed below, it requires the Court to
consider interrelationships between the nine subsections as well.
With this background, it is now possible to consider the various
decisions rendered by the Court in this area during the past three
years.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SUBSECTIONS OF SECTION
1581
A. Section 1581(a)
Section 1581(a) provides that the Court of International Trade
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action commenced
to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section
515 of the Tariff Act.15 This provision, which embodies nearly all
of the jurisdiction previously possessed by the Customs Court, is
designed to enable importers to challenge actions of the Customs
Service relating to the importation of merchandise. 16 A civil action
may be instituted pursuant to this section either by the person
who filed the protest or by a surety on the transaction that is sub-
Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1982) (existence of § 1581(c) jurisdiction does not preclude jurisdiction over other kinds of
actions arising under the countervailing duty and antidumping statutes).
14 E.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); United States v. Boe, 543
F.2d 151, 153 (C.C.P.A. 1976); O'Hare Servs., Inc. v. United States, 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No.
17, at 24, 25 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 30, 1982).
,5 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982); see infra text accompanying note 21.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982); see supra note 3 and accompanying text. For instance,
the Customs Courts Act of 1980 newly authorized the court to remand to the Customs Ser-
vice a suit instituted pursuant to § 1581(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 2643(b) (1982); see also House
of Adler v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 274, 277-78 (1981) (remand intended to provide
viable alternative to dismissal of claim where plaintiff was able to prove that administrative
action was in error but was unable to demonstrate proper result).
1984]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ject to the protest. 7 The protest must be filed within 90 days of
liquidation of duties or other payments owed,' and the civil action
must be filed within 180 days after the date when notice of the
denial of the protest is mailed, or within 180 days after the date
that denial of the protest becomes effective by operation of law
under the terms of section 515(b).' All liquidated duties, charges
or exactions must be paid when the action is commenced.20
1. Types of Decisions That May Be The Subject of a Protest
Since denial of a protest is a prerequisite to the institution of
a suit, the legitimacy of the protest must be known before the exis-
tence of jurisdiction can be ascertained. The seven types of Cus-
toms Service decisions that may properly serve as the subject of
the protest include:
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties
chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a
demand for redelivery to customs custody under any provision of
the customs laws, except a determination appealable under sec-
tion 1337 of ... [title 19, United States Code];
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or any modi-
fication thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; and
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 1520(c)
of [title 19, United States Code] . . ..
An importer may challenge a Customs Service decision falling into
one of these seven categories, as well as the "legality of all orders
or findings" that entered into the decision.22
Several recent decisions have considered the question of
whether a particular Customs Service decision comes within one of
17 28 U.S.C. § 2631(a) (1982).
- 19 U.S.C. § 1514(2)(A) (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 2636(a) (1982).
20 Id. § 2637(a). The plaintiff, if successful, receives a refund of the duties, charges, or
exactions with interest. Id. § 2644. A surety's obligation to pay liquidated duties is limited
to the sum of any bond related to each entry that formed the subject of the denied protest.
Id. § 2637(a).




these seven types. In Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. Blumenthal
(Alberta Gas 1),23 the plaintiff, an importer of Canadian methanol,
filed a protest against a decision of the Secretary of the Treasury
to commence an antidumping investigation involving Canadian
methanol. 24 The plaintiff alleged that its protest challenged an "or-
der or finding [that entered] into a decision to impose a charge or
exaction, '25 a type of decision specified in section 514(a)(3) of the
Tariff Act. The court rejected the plaintiff's challenge on the
ground that the decision was not subject to protest. In the court's
view, the terms "charge" and "exaction," as employed in section
514(a)(3), were not intended to embrace an interlocutory determi-
nation to initiate an antidumping investigation. These terms were
held to apply only to "actual assessments of specific sums of
money (other than ordinary customs duties)," and no such sum
had been assessed in this case.26
In Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, (Carlingswitch 1),27
the plaintiff voluntarily tendered a certain sum to the Customs
Service in connection with a civil penalty investigation prior to the
issuance of a penalty notice.28 Though no civil penalty was ever
assessed, the Customs Service rejected the plaintiff's demand for
return of the money.29 The plaintiff subsequently filed a protest
challenging the refusal and instituted suit in the Customs Court
when the protest was denied, claiming that the Customs Service's
refusal to refund the money constituted an "exaction."
The court rejected this contention, relying in part upon the
decision in Alberta Gas 130 According to the court, the term "exac-
tion" implied some form of coercion upon the part of the Customs
Service. In this case the plaintiff had made the payment volunta-
rily, and thus the payment did not constitute an "exaction" within
the meaning of section 514(a)(3).31
23 467 F. Supp. 1245 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
21 Id. at 1246.
25 Id. at 1249.
21 Id. at 1249-50.
27 500 F. Supp. 223 (Cust. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d 768 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
28 Id. at 224; see 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (b)(1)(A) (1982) (contents of pre-penalty notice).
21 500 F. Supp. at 226.
30 Id. at 227.
"' Id. at 226-27. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed on the ground,
among others, that a refusal to refund money is not a "charge" or "exaction" within the
meaning of § 514(a)(3) of the Tariff Act. See Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, 651 F.2d
768, 773 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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A similar result was reached on similar facts in ITT Semicon-
ductors v. United States.32 In that case, the Customs Service is-
sued a notice of penalty to the plaintiff. After negotiations between
the parties, the Customs Service reduced the amount demanded
and notified the plaintiff that unless it remitted the sums now
claimed, including an amount representing duties the Service al-
leged should have been paid on the entries at issue, the matter
would be referred to the Department of Justice for the possible
commencement of a civil penalty action." The plaintiff paid the
sums demanded and filed a protest relating only to the part of the
payment representing the claim for duties, on the grounds that
such demand represented a retroactive assessment of duties in vio-
lation of section 514. On denial of the protest, the plaintiff filed a
timely civil action in the Court of International Trade.3 4
The United States moved to dismiss the suit, relying upon the
decision in Carlingswitch L 3 The plaintiff alleged that this deci-
sion was distinguishable, since, unlike the Carlingswitch I plaintiff,
it had been "forced" to make the payment or face an action for the
imposition of a civil penalty. The Court rejected this attempted
distinction on the ground that the plaintiff had remitted the funds
voluntarily as a part of a decision by the Customs Service to miti-
gate the government's total claim against the plaintiff.3 6
The terms "charges" and "exactions" were also interpreted in
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. United States. The
plaintiff in that case was the surety for two importers who failed to
file a protest even though duties in excess of the estimated duties
that had been paid upon entry were assessed against their mer-
chandise upon liquidation. When the importers failed to pay the
additional duties, payment was demanded from the plaintiff. The
plaintiff failed to respond, and the Customs Service set off the
amounts due against amounts it owed the plaintiff. The plaintiff
then protested the setoff and, upon denial of its protest, filed suit
in the Court of International Trade.3 8
The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the "set-off"
32 576 F. Supp. 641 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
33 Id. at 642-43.
3 Id. at 643.
3' See id. at 644-45.
3' Id. at 645.
1 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 283 (1981).
38 Id. at 283-84.
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constituted an "exaction" within the meaning of section 514(a)(3)
and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction 39 The Court rea-
soned that section 514(a)(2) authorized the filing of a protest con-
cerning the amount of "duties chargeable," while section 514(a)(3)
authorized the filing of a protest against a "charge" or "exac-
tion."4 0 In the Court's view, these provisions were separate and dis-
tinct. The plaintiff initially had attempted to challenge the amount
of the duties assessed, but since that possibility had been fore-
closed due to the importers' failure to file a protest, the plaintiff
was now attempting to circumvent the section 514(a)(2) require-
ment by framing its challenge in terms of a protest to a "charge"
or "exaction" under section 514(a)(3). The Court refused to permit
such circumvention of the statutory standard.4'
Less judicial solicitude for congressional intent has been
shown in cases in which the importer's protest was based on exclu-
sion of merchandise from entry. In Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v.
United States (Alberta Gas II),42 the entry papers of a plaintiff
who was attempting to import methanol from Canada were re-
jected by the Customs Service on the grounds that the merchan-
dise was subject to a dumping finding and the plaintiff had failed
to file a bond for antidumping duties that might be assessed as a
result of the findings.43 The plaintiff protested the action taken by
the Customs Service and, upon denial of the protest, instituted
suit in the Customs Court.44
The United States conceded that the Customs Court pos-
sessed jurisdiction to consider the validity of the bond require-
ment, but argued that the plaintiff actually sought to contest the
validity of the underlying dumping as an order or finding "entering
'1 Id. at 285.
40 Id. at 284-85 & n.2.
Id. at 284-85. The Court maintained that plaintiff, in effect, was claiming that it had
been denied a property right without due process. Id. If this argument were valid, the Court
reasoned, the case was in the wrong forum since the proper court before which to bring its
protest on this issue would be the district court or the Court of Claims. Id. The problem
presented in St. Paul Fire & Marine may have been obviated by a recent amendment to §
514 which now permits a surety to file a protest within 90 days of the mailing of a notice of
demand for payment against its bond. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1982).
42 483 F. Supp. 303 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
43 Id. at 305. The Customs Service apparently also refused to permit the plaintiff to
take delivery of the merchandise due to its failure to provide a bond, although this is not
entirely clear from the opinion. Id. at 305-06; see 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982) (duty imposed
where strong potential exists for substantial injury or actual material injury to an industry).
" 483 F. Supp. at 305.
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into" the decision to require a bond, a claim that the court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain. According to the United States, if the im-
porter wished to challenge the underlying dumping finding, it first
had to import the merchandise, pay the duties assessed, file a pro-
test challenging the amount of duties paid, and await denial in or-
der to be able to file suit in the Qustoms Court." The Customs
Court rejected this position and maintained that it possessed juris-
diction to entertain the challenge to the underlying dumping find-
ing, since the situation presented was one in which the importer
could challenge a decision of the Customs Service without prior
payment of the duties assessed upon the merchandise. 4"
A similar question arose in Lowa, Ltd. v. United States.47 The
plaintiff in Lowa had filed a vessel repair entry and posted a bond
in order to obtain delivery of an airplane that had been repaired
abroad.48 Upon discovering that the aircraft was not subject to ves-
sel repair duties, the plaintiff sought to file a substitute entry sum-
mary.49  The substitute entry summary submitted, however,
claimed duty-free status for the aircraft, due to a change in the law
that had occurred after the aircraft's original entry into the United
States.50 The Customs Service refused to accept the substitute en-
try summary, and the plaintiff filed a protest challenging the rejec-
tion. Upon denial of the protest, the plaintiff commenced suit in
the Court of International Trade contending that the Court pos-
sessed jurisdiction because the protest concerned "the exclusion of
[its] merchandise from entry or delivery" within the meaning of
section 514(a)(4).
The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention. According to the
Court, the plaintiff had obtained delivery of the merchandise when
it filed its original vessel repair entry. 1 Since the plaintiff had ob-
tained delivery, the merchandise had entered the United States
' Id. at 310.
Id. at 310-11.
561 F. Supp. 441 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), affd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4 561 F. Supp. at 443. When the Customs Service learned that the aircraft was not
documented under United States laws, it recommended that the plaintiff substitute a new
entry in order to allow cancellation of the repair entry, and thus invalidation of the bond.
Id.
49 Id. The plaintiff contended that the aircraft was entitled to duty-free entry since it
was "used solely for corporate and personal purposes" and played no role in commerce or
trade. Id.
50 Id. at 444.
51 Id. at 445.
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commerce and thus had not been excluded from entry within the
meaning of section 514(a)(4) when the proffered substitute entry
was rejected. Alberta Gas 11 was distinguished solely upon the
ground that the plaintiff in that case had not obtained delivery of
the merchandise.52
The Lowa decision appears to be more closely in accord with
congressional intent than does the decision in Alberta Gas I. En-
try of merchandise into the customs territory of the United States
is clearly prohibited by statute unless the importer files entry pa-
pers53 and deposits an amount equal to the duties which it is esti-
mated will be imposed upon importation. 4 An importer may not
file an action in the Court of International Trade unless all liqui-
dated duties have been paid.5 5 These statutes demonstrate a clear
congressional intent to condition the right to import merchandise
and the right to challenge an assessment of duties upon prior pay-
ment of the duties assessed. The decision in Alberta Gas H per-
mits an importer to circumvent this congressional intent. By
tendering entry papers that the Customs Service rejects, the im-
porter can prompt a refusal to permit delivery of the merchandise.
According to the Alberta Gas H rationale, the importer could then
protest the exclusion of the merchandise and file an action upon
denial of the protest without paying the duties assessed.
It can be argued that the decision in Alberta Gas II possesses
too little practical significance to merit undue concern with its re-
sult. The actual situation presented in Alberta Gas H is unlikely to
recur, since section 1581(c), in combination with 19 U.S.C. § 1516a,
now establishes another mechanism by which an importer can
challenge a dumping finding.5 6 Moreover, an importer would stand
to gain little from using Alberta Gas II to evade the payment of
duties requirement, since it would incur the costs of storing the
excluded merchandise, as well as the risk that the merchandise
might be sold at auction by the Customs Service before the conclu-
52 Id.
53 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1)(A) (1982).
54 19 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (1982).
"5 Id. § 1514(c)(2). Section 1514(c), requires in relevant part, that "[a] protest of a deci-
sion, order, or finding . . . shall be filed . . . within ninety days after but not before ...
notice of liquidation or reliquidation. . . ." Id.
"6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c)(2) (1982). Section 1516a grants
both the Court of International Trade, and the International Trade Commission the power
to enjoin the liquidation of some or all entries after a proper request is made and it is
demonstrated that the requested relief should, under the circumstances, be granted. Id.
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sion of the case, thus rendering it moot.5 7
Although it is plausible to conclude that few importers would
be willing to incur these extra costs and the additional risk, a
means of reducing this risk was discovered and used by the plain-
tiff in Alberta Gas II. After the Court decided that it possessed
jurisdiction, but before the case was resolved on its merits, the
plaintiff realized that the Customs Service was about to sell the
excluded merchandise at auction.58 The plaintiff successfully ob-
tained an injunction from the Court under the All Writs Act,
prohibiting the sale until the case was resolved.59 The availability
of such injunctions justifies concern about the long-term implica-
tions of Alberta Gas II.
Moreover, Alberta Gas II is inconsistent with the principle of
judicial economy. The dumping finding issued by the Secretary of
the Treasury in that case did not automatically result in the impo-
sition of dumping duties, because the Customs Service was re-
quired to examine each entry of merchandise after the finding was
issued to determine the specific amount of dumping duty to be as-
sessed. It is therefore conceivable that the methanol shipment ex-
cluded would not have been assessed with dumping had it been
imported. If this had occurred, no action would have been filed. By
permitting the plaintiff to commence an action on the ground that
its merchandise had been excluded before it could know whether
dumping duties would be assessed, the Court permitted a suit to
proceed when it may not have been necessary to do so.60
"[R]efusal to reliquidate an entry under section 520(c) of the
Tariff Act of 1930" is another permissible ground for protest.61
57 See 19 U.S.C. § 1609 (1982) (absent filing of claim or posting of bond within 20 days,
customs officer shall declare merchandise forfeited and shall sell it at public auction).
"8 See Alberta Gas Chems., Inc. v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1332, 1333 (Cust. Ct.
1980).
59 Id. at 1332; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982).
60 Cf. Manhattan Shirt Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 270, 272 (1981) (prelimi-
nary injunctions should be sparingly used).
6- 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(7) (1982); see Godchaux-Henderson Sugar Co. v. United States,
496 F. Supp. 1326 (Cust. Ct. 1980). In Godchaux-Henderson, the plaintiff did not make
entry of merchandise while it was duty free pursuant to the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences because it assumed that the merchandise was not eligible for duty-free treatment. Id.
at 1328-29. By the time the plaintiff realized its mistake and made entry, the merchandise
was no longer eligible for duty-free treatment and the entry was liquidated with duty. Id. at
1330-31. The plaintiff subsequently attempted to obtain reliquidation pursuant to § 520(c).
Id. at 1329. The court held that § 520(c) applied to an error in any "entry, liquidation or
other customs transaction," but did not apply to the situation presented in this
case-failure to make an entry. Id. at 1330-31.
[Vol. 58:700
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Section 520(c)(1) authorizes the reliquidation of an entry to
correct:
a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence not
amounting to an error in the construction of a law, adverse to the
importer . . . in any . . . customs transaction, when the error,
mistake, or inadvertence is brought to the attention of the appro-
priate customs officer within one year after the date of liquidation
or exaction.2
In St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States,3 the Court dismissed
a civil action that alleged failure to reliquidate an entry pursuant
to section 520(c) because the importer did not bring the error in-
volved to the attention of the customs officer within the time pe-
riod specified in that section, 4 even though a timely protest had
been filed and a timely civil action was commenced upon its de-
nial6  In Adorence Co. v. United States,6 6 the Court again dis-
missed an action involving section 520(c)(1) when the mistake was
called to the attention of the Customs Service more than 1 year
after entry. 7 The plaintiff contended that it acted in reliance upon
erroneous information and the liquidation constituted a "transac-
tion" within the meaning of the statute.6 ' According to the plain-
tiff, it had complied with the statute's terms, since the statute per-
62 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (1982). Prior to its amendment in 1978, this provision required
the importer to bring an error to the attention of the Customs Service within 1 year after
the date of the entry or transaction, or within 90 days after liquidation or exaction when the
liquidation or exaction was made more than 9 months after the date of the entry or transac-
tion. 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (1976).
63 15 Cust. B. & Dec. 35 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
64 Id. at 36-37. St. Regis Paper Co. involved the pre-amendment version of § 520(c). Id.
at 36.
" Id., at 36; cf. PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 84 Cust. Ct. 256, 259 (1980) (post-
poning decision on question of whether error was timely brought to attention of Customs
Service until considerations of merits of the action). It is not clear from the St. Regis Paper
Co. opinion whether the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In F.W. Myers & Co. v. United States, 376
F. Supp. 86 (Cust. Ct. 1974), however, dismissal of a similar action for lack of jurisdiction
was predicated on the grounds that the error upon which the request for reliquidation was
premised had not been brought to the attention of the Customs Service within 1 year of
liquidation. Id. at 11.
'6 539 F. Supp. 1216 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
67 Id. at 1218. Like St. Regis Paper Co., Adorence involved the pre-amendment version
of § 520(c). See 539 F. Supp. at 1217. The portion of the statute that required the importer
to bring the error to the attention of the Customs Service within 90 days after liquidation
was not applicable in this case, however, because liquidation had occurred less than 9
months after entry. Id. at 1218.
6s 539 F. Supp. at 1217-18.
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mitted it to bring the error to the attention of the Customs Service
within 1 year of the liquidation even though it failed to bring the
error to the attention of the Customs Service within 1 year of
entry. 9
The Adorence Court rejected this position, asserting that the
relevant error for section 520 purposes occurred when the plaintiff
supplied incorrect information on its entry papers.70 To hold other-
wise, reasoned the Court, would render the statutory language re-
dundant; if all errors occurring before liquidation could be chal-
lenged under section 520, there would be no need for the statute to
refer to specific preliquidation events. 71
The decision in Adorence was distinguished by the Court in
Lester Engineering Co. v. United States.72 In Lester, the Customs
Service substantially advanced the entered values upon liquida-
tion, some 15 months after entry.7 Eight months after the liquida-
tion, the plaintiff requested the Customs Service to reliquidate the
entries according to section 520(c)(1). The Customs Service refused
on the ground that the case involved an error in the construction
of the law that could have been remedied had the plaintiff filed a
protest within 90 days of liquidation. Since no protest had been
filed, the liquidation was final unless the plaintiff could obtain reli-
quidation pursuant to section 520(c)(1). Reliquidation appeared to
be foreclosed, however, since liquidation had occurred more than 9
months after entry, and the version of the statute then in force
required any errors to be brought to the attention of the Customs
Service within 90 days after liquidation.74 By bringing the error to
the attention of the Customs Service 8 months after liquidation,
the plaintiff in Lester apparently had not complied with the
statute.7
5
Notwithstanding these facts, the Court held that the plaintiff
had timely brought the error to the attention of the Customs Ser-
vice.76 Under a Customs Service regulation then in effect, it was
permissible for an error that "occurred in the liquidation" to be
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1218.
71 Id.
72 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 29, at 15 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 22, 1982).
" Id. at 16.
7' Id. at 17-18. Lester also involved the pre-amendment version of § 520(c). See supra
notes 15 & 18.
71 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 29, at 18.
76 Id. at 19.
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brought to the attention of the Customs Service within 1 year of
the liquidation, even if liquidation occurred more than 9 months
after entry.77 For this reason, the plaintiff's action in bringing the
error to the attention of the Customs Service was timely under the
regulation. 7
The Lester decision appears to be an incorrect resolution of
the same issue presented in Adorence. The relevant statutes
clearly indicate that Congress intended a liquidation made more
than 9 months after the date of entry to become "final and conclu-
sive" unless a protest has been filed within 90 days of the liquida-
tion. Section 520(c) provides a very limited exception to this prin-
ciple. The Lester Court, in permitting an importer to challenge a
liquidation long after the 90-day period had elapsed, read section
520(c) too broadly to comport with the intent of the statute. The
Court relied upon a regulation that attempted to circumvent the
clear language of the statute by defining the term "transaction" to
include liquidation. In this manner, the regulation purported to al-
low an importer to bring an error allegedly occurring in a liquida-
tion to the attention of the Customs Service within 1 year of liqui-
dation, despite the fact that liquidation occurred more than 9
months after entry. This regulation was contrary to the clear lan-
guage of the statute, and thus should not have been relied upon by
the Court.7
9
2. Time Within Which A Protest Must Be Filed
Section 514(c)(2) currently provides that a protest must be
filed within 90 days of liquidation; if no protest is filed within that
time, the liquidation becomes final and conclusive.80
11 Id. at 17. 19 C.F.R. § 173.4(c)(2) (1978). The customs regulation provided, in perti-
nent part, that "except. . . in cases where the error originates in the liquidation, reliquida-
tion, or exaction, the 1-year limitation provided for. . . shall apply." Id.
78 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 29, at 19. The Lester court distinguished Adorence by noting
that the error in Adorence had occurred in the entry, not in the liquidation. Id. at 18. In
contrast, in the Lester case, the Customs Service had advanced the entered values when it
liquidated the entry, so the error occurred in the liquidation, not in the entry. Id. at 19.
11 Cf. Adorence Co. v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982)
(rejecting argument that term "transaction" as used in § 520(c) be interpreted to include
liquidation). The Court's treatment of the time limits concluded in § 520(c) as jurisdictional
limits parallels its treatment of the time limits in § 514. See Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1214, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (tolling of 90-day limitations period until final
agency action taken permitted to prevent elevation of procedure over substance).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2) (1982).
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In American Export Lines, Inc. v. United States,8' the plain-
tiff filed a vessel repair entry as soon as its ship, which had been
repaired abroad, returned to the United States. 2 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the duties that
ordinarily would be assessed upon the cost of the repairs. However,
plaintiff failed to supply certain required information with its
petition. 3
About 2 weeks after liquidation, the plaintiff sent a letter to
the Customs Service requesting cancellation of the duties.84 After
an exchange of letters, the Customs Service denied the plaintiff's
request for cancellation on January 14, 1977. The plaintiff wrote to
the Customs Service again on April 7, 1977, supplying supplemen-
tal information and requesting the reasons for the denial of its ear-
lier request for cancellation. This request was denied on July 28,
1977. The plaintiff filed a formal protest within 90 days of the de-
nial, and after denial of the protest, filed a civil action. 5
The action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it
was not timely filed.8 6 According to the Court, the November 5,
1975 letter requesting cancellation of the duties constituted a
timely protest of the October 24, 1975 liquidation. This protest,
stated the Court, had been denied by the Customs Service on Jan-
uary 14, 1977. Since the civil action was filed more than 180 days
from the date of denial of the protest, dismissal was mandatory.
The Customs Service's July 28, 1977 response to the plaintiff's let-
ter of April 7, 1977 was construed as merely reaffirming the Cus-
toms Service's January denial of the request for cancellation and
thus as not causing the 180-day statutory period to recommence.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed.87 Accord-
ing to the appellate court, the Customs Court acquired jurisdiction
8' 496 F. Supp. 1320 (Cust. Ct. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
82 496 F. Supp. at 1322.
83 Id. Pursuant to the current version of § 466(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, duties are
assessed upon the cost of repairs made upon American vessels. 19 U.S.C. § 1466(a) (1982).
The statute permits the Secretary of the Treasury to remit the duties, however, upon re-
ceipt of good and sufficient evidence that the repairs were required, due to the stress of
weather or to other casualties, in order to insure the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel.
Id. § 1466(d). Evidence of the necessity of the repairs it had made was the information not
submitted by the plaintiff ship owner in American Export Lines. 496 F. Supp. at 1322.
84 496 F. Supp. at 1323.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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to entertain the civil action pursuant to its own jurisdictional stat-
ute, not by virtue of section 514.8 Thus, the 90-day period con-
tained in section 514 was not jurisdictional; rather, it was nothing
more than a statute of limitations that could be tolled. 9
The appellate court then examined the facts presented and
determined that the 90-day period was tolled from November 5,
1975, when the plaintiff first requested cancellation of duties, until
July 28, 1977, when the Customs Service finally denied the plain-
tiff's request for cancellation."0 Since less than 90 days, excluding
the days during which the 90-day period was tolled, had elapsed
between when the entry was liquidated and when the plaintiff's
formal protest was filed, the court concluded that the protest had
been timely filed.
The suggestion by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
that the 90-day period specified in section 514 is merely a statute
of limitations is subject to great doubt. The jurisdictional statute
then in force gave the Customs Court exclusive jurisdiction "of
civil actions instituted by any person whose protest pursuant to
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended," had been denied.9 1 Since the
phrase "pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended" incorpo-
rates by reference the section 514 requirement that a protest be
filed within 90 days of liquidation, failure to file a timely protest
should have resulted in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.92
Even if the 90-day period is viewed as a statute of limitations,
however, that type of statute generally has been construed as juris-
dictional when applied to suits against the United States, because
such statutes are normally viewed as part of the government's con-
88 Id. at 1217 n.7; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1982) (Court of International Trade has exclu-
sive jurisdiction of actions commenced by the United States to recover duties or on a bond
"relating to the importation of merchandise").
Il 657 F.2d at 1217-18. Compare id. (petition entertainable despite lack of formal pro-
test because party informally brought matter to attention of Customs Service after liquida-
tion) with United States v. Reliable Chem. Co., 605 F.2d 1179, 1184 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (protest
may not be filed before notice of liquidation) and Hambro Automotive Corp. v. United
States, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (failure to file timely protest under § 1514 pre-
empted access to Customs Court).
"0 657 F.2d at 1218.
0, 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1982).
02 Prior to Farrell Lines, failure to file a timely protest resulted in an automatic dismis-
sal for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Akeroyd & Son v. United States, 19 C.C.P.A. 249, 258
(protest filed after original 30-day post-liquidation period held void), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
550 (1931).
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sent to be sued." Any suit instituted without complying with such
a statute is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.94
3. Payment of Duties
Section 2637(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
that an action may be commenced in the Court of International
Trade pursuant to section 1581(a) only if "all liquidated duties
...have been paid at the time the action is commenced. . .."95
In Heraeus-Amersil, Inc. v. United States,96 the Customs Ser-
vice, upon liquidation, assessed an amount of duties greater than
the estimated duties deposited upon entry.97 The importer filed a
protest with the Customs Service concerning the additional duties,
and refused to pay the entire sum demanded. Before rendering a
decision on the protest, the Customs Service proposed to revoke
the importer's immediate delivery privileges because of its refusal
to remit the sum due. The importer brought an action intended, in
part, to enjoin the revocation of its immediate delivery privileges.
The Court held that when a protest is filed, additional duties as-
sessed are not due until the protest is denied and a civil action is
filed in the Court of International Trade under section 1581(a) or
until the time for filing such an action has expired.98 Since the im-
porter's protest had not been denied, the time for filing a civil ac-
tion had not expired and the additional duties thus were not due
and payable. Since the additional duties were not due and payable,
11 See, e.g., O'Hare Servs., Inc. v. United States, 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 17, at 24, 24-25
(Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 30, 1982); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. United States, 521 F. Supp.
473, 476-78 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 212 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
94 E.g., Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1957). In Schering Corp. v.
United States, 626 F.2d 162 (C.C.P.A. 1980), the plaintiff filed a protest more than 90 days
after liquidation, contending that since the entry papers were not made available to it at the
time of liquidation, the liquidation was void, id. at 164-65. The court indicated that failure
to make the entry papers available would not render the liquidation void, but could toll the
time within which a protest must be filed. 626 F.2d at 166 n.8; see also American Air Parcel
Forwarding Co. v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 117, 120 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (no subject
matter jurisdiction where importer failed to pay § 2637(a) additional duties before filing
protest); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467, 471 & n.12 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (legisla-
tive history of § 1581 indicates Congressional intent to prevent subsection (i) from being
used to replace administrative review).
95 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) (1982).
96 515 F. Supp. 770 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d 1356 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
515 F. Supp. at 772.
98 Id. at 774-75.
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the Court held that the Customs Service could not revoke the im-
porter's immediate delivery privileges due to failure to pay the ad-
ditional duties.9
In Eddietron, Inc. v. United States,00 the Court interpreted
the predecessor of section 2637(a), which provided that no action
could be commenced in the Customs Court pursuant to the prede-
cessor of section 1581(a) unless all liquidated duties have been
paid. The plaintiff in Eddietron had tendered a single promissory
note for duties assessed on six entries. 101 The plaintiff had paid
approximately $7,000 on this note, an amount less than the face
amount but sufficient to pay the duties on one of the six entries. 10 2
Upon examination of the statutes relating to the payment of du-
ties, the Court held that tender of a promissory note to the Cus-
toms Service constituted only a provisional payment of the duties
assessed and, thus, did not satisfy the requirement that all duties
must "have been" paid before a civil action could be com-
menced. 10 3 The Court applied the $7,000 payment to one of the
entries, however, and held that this entry was properly before it,
since by protecting the government's position and putting the im-
porter "at a financial disadvantage" the payment satisfied the pur-
pose of the payment of duties requirement.10 4
In Dynasty Footwear v. United States,105 the plaintiff pro-
tested the liquidation of seventeen entries and filed requests for
reliquidation. 106 Fifteen of the seventeen protests were resolved in
the plaintiff's favor. One of the remaining two protests was denied
on September 12, 1980.107 On March 11, 1981, the last day possible
under the statute, the plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Interna-
" Id. at 775.
493 F. Supp. 585 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
101 Id. at 588.
102 Id. at 589.
103 Id. at 590.
1' Id. at 589-90.
101 551 F. Supp. 1138 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
z Id., at 1139. The plaintiff in Dynasty Footwear was contesting the appraised value
of shoes imported from Taiwan. Id. During the review period, the plaintiff had reached an
agreement with customs officials to suspend temporarily the collection of duties assessed on
the plaintiff's liquidated entries. Id. The suspension was based in part on the "drastic ef-
fect" that collection was having on the plaintiff's financial stability, and was conditioned on
the plaintiff taking whatever action was necessary to expedite reliquidation. Id.
107 Id. The plaintiff owed $19,983.60 in additional duties on the protested entry, num-
ber 233148. Id.
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tional Trade.0 8
The government's motion to dismiss, based on the ground that
the plaintiff had not paid the duties assessed before commencing
the action, was denied by the Court.'0 9 The Court observed that
one of the protests that the plaintiff had filed was granted on Octo-
ber 31, 1980. Since the protest was granted, the plaintiff was due a
refund that would be more than sufficient to pay the duties as-
sessed upon the entry before the Court under the denied protest."'
The entry that had been the subject of the granted protest was not
reliquidated until May 27, 1981, and the Customs Service did not
offset the amount due from the plaintiff as a result of the denied
protest against the refund owed until June, 1981-after the civil
action had been commenced."'
The Court found that under the circumstances present in this
case, there was no reason why the offset could not have been made
in October 1980, before the plaintiff had begun the action. It con-
cluded, therefore, that since, at the time the action was filed, the
United States had in its possession funds belonging to the plain-
tiffs that were more than sufficient to pay the duties resulting from
the denied protest, the duties should be considered as having been
paid prior to the institution of the suit."2 This result was not in-
consistent with the purpose of section 2637(a), which was designed
to prevent the importer from retaining the use of funds represent-
ing the assessed duties during the pendency of the court
proceedings." 3
4. Premature Protests
The original version of section 514 provided that a liquidation
"shall, upon the expiration of sixty days after the date of such liq-
108 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2636 (1982) (action contesting the denial of protest under § 515
of the Tariff act must be commenced within 180 days of denial).
109 551 F. Supp. at 1139. The Government's argument was premised on 28 U.S.C. §
2637(a) (1982). See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
110 551 F. Supp. at 1139. The refund due the plaintiff on the successfully protested
entry was $24,588, which exceeded the amount it owed to the Customs Service on entry
number 233148. Id.
1 551 F. Supp. at 1139.
12 Id. at 1141. Since the court found that the Customs Service could have, and should
have, completed the setoff before March 11, 1981, it exercised its equity power and deemed
the setoff to have occurred prior to that date. Id.
113 Id.; see Hearings on S. 2624 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1970).
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uidation. . . be final and conclusive. . . unless the importer...
shall, within sixty days after, but not before such liquidation...
file a protest . ,,114
In United States v. C.O. Mason, Inc.,115 entries had been liq-
uidated between 1957 and 1959 pursuant to section 319 of the
Tariff Act and a statute enacted by the legislature of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico.11 6 In a decision that became final in 1960,
the Customs Court held the statute unconstitutional. Shortly
thereafter, the importer filed protests against the 1957 and 1959
liquidation and, upon denial of the protests, filed an action in the
Customs Court. 117 The United States moved to dismiss on the
ground that the protests had not been filed within 60 days of the
liquidation." 8 The Customs Court granted this motion, not be-
cause the protests had been filed late, but because they had been
filed prematurely." 9
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed, following
the lower court's reasoning that the civil action was "premature,"
since in the absence of valid liquidation there could be no valid
protests. 20 The court accordingly dismissed the action and ordered
that the entries be properly liquidated this time, presumably with-
out regard to the unconstitutional statute.'2'
In A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States (A.N. Deringer 1),122
M' Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. 4, § 514, 46 Stat. 590, 734 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1514 (1982)).
215 51 C.C.P.A. 107 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 999 (1965). The cases in this section
predate the formation of the Court of International Trade, but familiarity with them is
essential to understanding some of the court's recent decisions.
'" Id. at 110.
"27 Id. at 109.
,8 Id. At the time of the Mason case, § 514 of the Tariff Act provided for a 60-day
filing period. Id.
10 51 C.C.P.A. at 110.
120 Id. at 112, 114. The Mason court noted that the protested liquidations had been
made under an inoperative law, since the statute's invalidity dated from the time of its
enactment. Id. Thus, the statute could provide no basis for the liquidations or for subse-
quent protests. Id. Since the contested liquidations were "void," the court concluded that
the filing actually occurred before a liquidation, in contravention of the requirements of §
514. Id. at 113. The court later applied the same reasoning in United States v. Cajo Trading,
Inc., 403 F.2d 268, 269 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968). The Cajo-Mason doc-
trine was, at one time, a means for circumventing the 60-day period specified in § 514. But
see infra note 134 (Cajo-Mason doctrine overruled by amendment to § 514).
121 551 C.C.P.A. at 114. The court called for a liquidation "in the manner provided by
law." Id. Liquidation pursuant to an unconstitutional provision was not a liquidation as
provided by law. Id. at 113.
122 447 F. Supp. 453 (Cust. Ct. 1978), vacated and remanded, 593 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A.
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the plaintiff's merchandise was refused entry because it was not
labeled in accordance with regulations of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration. 23 The merchandise was liquidated despite the denial
of entry, and the plaintiff filed a timely protest against the liquida-
tion. 2 " In the subsequent civil action, the Court held that the liq-
uidation had occurred in violation of a Customs Service regulation
requiring suspension of liquidation until a determination whether
the merchandise may be admitted is made. 2 5 Since this liquidation
had occurred after the Customs Service had decided that the mer-
chandise should be excluded, the Court accordingly found the liq-
uidation to be void. The Court therefore dismissed the action be-
cause the protest was "premature."'2 6
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals vacated the dismis-
sal. "'27 Although the Customs Court had construed the Customs
Service regulation as prohibiting liquidation altogether if the mer-
chandise was refused admission, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals construed the regulation as merely prohibiting liquidation
until it was determined whether the merchandise was to be admit-
ted. 128 Since the merchandise in A.N. Deringer I was liquidated
after it had been determined that admission would be refused, the
entry had been liquidated in accordance with the regulation. The
case was therefore remanded to the Customs Court to determine
whether the plaintiff was entitled to a refund. 29
The facts in A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States (A.N. Der-
1979).
12 Id. at 453-54.
124 Id. at 454. Liquidation of the disputed entries took place after the merchandise was
exported from the United States under customs supervision, 17 days prior to the liquidation
date. Id.
121 Id. at 455. The court reasoned that liquidation of merchandise denied entry was "a
useless act" since the duties deposited would be refunded once the goods were exported or
destroyed in accordance with the governing statute. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1558(a)(2) (1982)
(providing for refund upon supervised exportation or destruction of merchandise).
126 446 F. Supp. at 455; see infra note 155.
127 United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 593 F.2d 1015, 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
128 Id. at 1019. The regulation provided that "liquidation ... shall be suspended until
it is determined whether admission ... is permitted." Id. at 1018 n.3. The court thus held
that a liquidation performed after a determination was valid under the regulation, since
"[w]hether that determination results in the goods being admitted or not is simply irrele-
vant to the question of a liquidation's conformance with § 12.6." Id. The court limited its
holding, however, to a finding that the entry had been liquidated in conformance with the
regulation, and explicitly stated that it did not hold "that the liquidation is, in all respects,
correct." Id. at 1019 n.7.
"I Id. at 1019.
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inger 11)130 were similar to those in A.N. Deringer I, except that in
A.N. Deringer II the merchandise had been liquidated before no-
tice of refusal was given and a protest was not filed until after the
expiration of the period specified in section 514.1-1 Despite these
differences, the Court reached the same result as in A.N. Deringer
I; it dismissed the action holding that since the liquidation was
void, the protest was a nullity. 32
This dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals, which held that the liquidation had not conformed
with the regulation because it had occurred prior to determination
of whether the merchandise was to be admitted. 33 However, the
court rejected the Customs Court's holding that a non-conforming
liquidation was necessarily void. Instead, the court determined
that, under the statute, the invalidity of a liquidation could only
be challenged by a protest filed within the time specified in section
514. Since the protest in this case had not been filed within the
specified time period, the court held that the Customs Court had
never possessed jurisdiction to entertain the challenge.13 4
B. Section 1581(b)
Section 1581(b) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of
International Trade to entertain any civil action commenced under
section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.115 Pursuant to section 516,
which establishes the so-called "American manufacturer's protest,"
an American manufacturer may request the Secretary to furnish
the classification and rate of duty imposed upon merchandise pro-
130 447 F. Supp. 451 (Cust. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 593 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
131 Id. at 452.
132 Id. at 453.
M United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 593 F.2d 1015, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
13' Id. at 1020-21. The court further held that the Cajo-Mason doctrine had been over-
ruled, in effect, by an amendment to § 514. Id. at 1020; see supra note 120. When the
doctrine was first developed, the statute required the Customs Service to liquidate an entry
"as provided by law." 593 F.2d at 1020. The Mason court, in reliance on such language, held
that a liquidation that did not occur "as provided by law" was void. Id.; see supra note 120.
Section 514 as amended, however, simply directs the Customs Service to "liquidate" the
entry. 593 F.2d at 1020. Given the omission of the phrase "as provided by law" from the
amended version and the fact that the present version mandates the filing of a protest to
challenge a liquidation, "including the legality of all orders and findings entering into the
same," 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1982), the court held that a challenge to a liquidation, even one
allegedly resulting from a violation of a regulation, must be made by means of a timely
protest. 593 F.2d at 1020-21.
-35 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b) (1982); see 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1982).
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duced by the party requesting the information. 136 In Stewart-
Warner Corp. v. United States,"7 the plaintiff, an American man-
ufacturer, had not requested the Secretary to provide information
concerning the classification or rate of duty prior to filing its peti-
tion with the Secretary advocating a change in the classification as
rate of duty. The Court held that this failure did not amount to a
jurisdictional defect. The Court noted that a civil action may be
commenced without a preliminary request for information if the
petitioner already possesses the information and, in this case, it
was not disputed that the plaintiff possessed the information. The
Court noted that "to require more of a plaintiff would be a min-
dless formalism."' 38
C. Section 1581(c)
Section 1581(c) vests in the Court of International Trade ex-
clusive jurisdiction to entertain any civil action commenced under
section 516A of the Tariff Act.' Section 516A was enacted by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Trade Agreements Act), ° which
completely revised the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws.141 Since section 516A contains the judicial review provisions
applicable to these revised statutes, its provisions are inextricably
intertwined with the provisions of those statutes.
136 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1982). If the requesting party believes that the apprised value,
classification, or rate of duty is incorrect, it may file a petition with the Secretary requesting
an appropriate change. If the Secretary denies the petition, the requesting party may file a
notice of a desire to contest the Secretary's decision. If a notice is filed, then the Secretary is
to supply the petitioner with the information that is required to enable the petitioner to
contest the appraised value, classification or rate of duty imposed on one entry of the mer-
chandise. Id.
1 577 F. Supp. 25 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
131 Id. at 25 n.1.
-39 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982); see 18 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1982).
140 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 13 & 19 U.S.C.
(1982)).
" The Trade Agreements Act superseded the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. 3, § 303,
46 Stat. 687 (current version codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)) (countervailing duties) and
the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. 2, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982)) (antidumping duties). See generally; Note, Injury Determinations
Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1079-80, 1095-1106 (1981) (discussion of the old and new
antidumping laws). The new provisions added by the Trade Agreements Act will be referred
to as the "new law," and the provisions they have replaced will be referred to as the "old




The substantial revisions of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws contained in the Trade Agreements Act gave rise
to the question of the effect of the new provisions upon adminis-
trative determinations regarding 'antidumping and countervailing
duties made pursuant to the old laws. Congress attempted to an-
swer this question by building certain transitional rules into the
statute. 142 These transitional rules were designed so as to continue
in effect antidumping and countervailing findings made under the
previous laws and to subject those findings to the new administra-
tive procedures. For example, section 751 of the Tariff Act as
amended by the new law requires the International Trade Admin-
istration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) to conduct an an-
nual review of each outstanding antidumping order to determine
the amount of duty to be assessed on imports subject to the order
during the preceding year as well as the estimated duties to be de-
posited until the next annual review.14 3 The transitional rules also
make clear that countervailing duty orders in effect upon the effec-
tive date of the new amendments are to remain in effect, and shall
similarly be subject to an annual review pursuant to section 751.144
Section 751(b) provides that under certain circumstances, the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) may conduct a review in or-
der to determine whether an industry in the United States would
be threatened with material injury if an antidumping order were to
be modified or revoked. 45 Four cases have been decided by the
Court of International Trade interpreting these transitional rules
in a jurisdictional context.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 46 a
representative of the domestic industry intervened in an action
brought by various importers and manufacturers to challenge the
outcome of a 751(b) review in which the ITC had determined that
1'42 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 102-106, 93 Stat. 144, 189-
93 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1982)).
143 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1982). The ITA is also charged with the responsibility of
determining whether a subsidy has been provided within the meaning of the countervailing
duty laws or whether sales have been made at less than fair market value according to the
antidumping laws. Id. § 1675(a)(2).
' See id. § 1671.
14- Id. § 1675(b)(1). The ITC is charged with the responsibility of determining whether
subsidized imports or imports sold in this country at less than fair value, are causing injury
to an American industry. Id. § 1671d(b)(1).
14 529 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
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a 1971 antidumping finding should not be revoked.'47 The inter-
venor moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that section 751(b) did not authorize the ITC to review
dumping findings made under the prior law. 14 The intervenor's ar-
gument was based on a prior antidumping law that termed the
final result of the administrative process a "finding," whereas the
new law terms the final result of the administrative process an
"order.",' 49
Section 751(a), which established the annual review process,
specifically provides that an annual review shall be conducted of
both "orders" and "findings.' 50 Both section 751(b), which pro-
vided for a review in order to determine whether an antidumping
decision should be revoked, and section 751(c), which authorized
revocation, however, do not refer to "findings."' 51 The intervenor
contended that this language showed that Congress intended an-
tidumping findings to be subject to annual review under section
751(a), but did not contemplate the revocation of a finding under
sections 751(b) and 751(c). 52
After examining the statutory language, the Court rejected the
intervenor's contention. The Court observed that Congress specifi-
cally provided in section 106 of the Trade Agreements Act that
"findings" shall remain in effect and be subject to review under
"section 751" -a reference that was not limited to section 751(a),
but included sections 751(b) and 751(c) as well. 53
Section 102(b)(2) of the Trade Agreements Act provided that
preliminary determinations made by the Secretary of the Treasury
under the old law but not made final by the effective date of the
superseding Act were to be treated as if they were preliminary de-
terminations made under the Trade Agreements Act.' The time
'7 Id. at 671.
18 Id. The original dumping finding was made under the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch.
14, tit. 2, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. 11, (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1982)),
which was repealed in 1979 and superseded by the Trade Agreements Act, see infra note
153. In effect, the intervenor was arguing that determinations under the old law were not
subject to review, modification, or revocation, except for an annual review to determine the
amount of the duty as authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a). 529 F. Supp. at 671.
529 F. Supp. at 671.
180 See id.
161 See id. at 672.
182 Id. at 671; see infra note 181.
'5' 529 F. Supp. at 673-74; see Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106,
93 Stat. 144.
1'" Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 102(b)(2), 93 Stat. 144.
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limits and procedures of the new law were thus to apply to deter-
minations made from that point forward. 5 In Southwest Florida
Winter Vegetable Growers Association v. United States,'56 the
Secretary of the Treasury instituted an antidumping investigation
under the old law.'5 7 Shortly before the effective date of the Trade
Agreements Act, the Secretary issued a tentative determination
that there were no sales at less than fair value. The plaintiffs, at
whose request the investigation was commenced, filed an action af-
ter the effective date of the Trade Agreements Act to challenge the
Secretary's tentative decision.'58 They contended that under the
Trade Agreements Act, the Secretary's tentative decision must be
treated as if it were a negative preliminary decision, specifically
subject to judicial review under section 516A of the Tariff Act.159
The Court disagreed and held that, pursuant to section
102(b)(2), the tentative determination was to be treated, for ad-
ministrative purposes, as if it were a negative preliminary determi-
nation made under the new law. However, the Court noted that
the transitional rules governing the availability of judicial review of
such determinations specifically provided that administrative deci-
sions were subject to judicial review "in the same manner and to
the same extent as if made on the day before the effective date" of
the Trade Agreements Act.' Since tentative determinations by
the Secretary of the Treasury were not subject to judicial review
under the old law, the Court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction.'6 '
A similar result was reached in Goldsmith & Eggleton, Inc. v.
United States.'6 2 The old law stipulated that an importer who
wished to challenge an antidumping finding had to import the
merchandise, pay any antidumping duties assessed, file a protest,
and on denial of the protest, file an action in the Customs Court.' 63
,5 Id.
,i" 484 F. Supp. 910 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
'i" Id. at 911.
"I Id. at 911-12.
,19 Id. at 913.
160 Id. at 913. The court interpreted the statutory language as clearly stating that, for
the purpose of judicial review, the law to be applied was the law in effect on the day before
the Trade Agreements Act became effective. Id. Such judicial review was to proceed "with-
out regard to the amendments made by title X of the [Trade Agreements Act]." Id.
" ' Id. at 915.
162 563 F. Supp. 1377 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
" See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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Obviously, this process required liquidation of at least one entry.
Often, it would take some time after the issuance of a dumping
finding to determine the exact amount of the dumping duty to be
assessed on an entry of merchandise. Thus, under the old law, an
importer frequently was not provided with an opportunity to chal-
lenge a dumping finding until some time after its issuance when an
entry, subject to the finding, was finally liquidated.
In contrast, merchandise subject to an antidumping order
under the new law is not liquidated during the period between the
issuance of the order (or the last annual review) and the comple-
tion of the first annual review under section 751; instead, the
amount of antidumping duty to be assessed on all entries made
during the pre-review period is determined in the section 751
review.1 4
Ordinarily, these differences between the new and old laws
would have little significance. Under the old law, however, an im-
porter who challenged certain administrative decisions under the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws was entitled to a trial
de novo in the Customs Court,"6 5 whereas under the new law, an
importer is entitled only to review based on the administrative rec-
ord.166 Congress preserved this right to a trial de novo in section
1002(b)(3) of the new law only in regard to those imlorters not
accorded a right to challenge a dumping finding due to the failure
to liquidate an entry prior to the effective date of the new law. 67
In Goldsmith & Eggleton, Inc., an antidumping finding was
issued in 1973, but no entries were liquidated as of the date the
action was filed. 1 8 The ITA conducted an annual review under sec-
tion 751 of the new law; the plaintiff, however, did not partici-
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1) (1982).
M See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976) (party contesting assessment of duties has right to de
novo trial); see, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 469 F. Supp. 270, 274 (Cust. Ct.
1979); cf. Connors Steel Corp. v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 358 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981),
modified, 566 F. Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (in actions not involving assessment of
duties, review should be "limited to the administrative record").
266 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (1982).
267 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1002(b)(3), 93 Stat. 144, 306-07
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1982)). In Diversified Prods. Corp. v. United States, 572 F.
Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), the Court of International Trade determined that §
1002(b)(3) applied only to judicial review, not to administrative review. Id. at 886. There-
fore, the ITA is authorized to review fully a dumping finding made before passage of the
Trade Agreements Act in order to determine the finding's scope. Id.




pate.'6 9 Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted suit, under the new
law, to challenge the final results of the review, alleging a violation
of its constitutional right of due process. 170 The United States con-
tended that the plaintiff was precluded from challenging the deter-
mination because it had not participated in the administrative pro-
cess; the plaintiff argued, to the contrary, that its failure to
participate was excused because it received no notice of the annual
review. 17
The Court dismissed the action for reasons other than those
initially advanced by the United States.' 72 Since no entries had
been liquidated under the finding issued in 1973, the Court rea-
soned that the transitional rules governing judicial review rendered
the finding subject to judicial review under the old law. Thus, the
plaintiff could not challenge the finding until duties were assessed
on the entries involved.' 73
2. Judicial Review Under The New Law
Section 516A divides ITA and ITC determinations that may
be made under the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes
into preliminary and final determinations. 74 Preliminary and final
determinations are subject to different standards of judicial review,
different time limits, and different methods for filing an action.
The new law requires the ITA and ITC to make preliminary
determination within specified periods of time after the com-
mencement of a countervailing duty investigation. 175 The ITC
makes a preliminary determination as to whether a domestic in-
dustry is being injured by the importation of the merchandise
"9 Id. The plaintiff in Goldsmith was allegedly the sole purchaser of the subject mer-
chandise, which a 1973 dumping determination had found to be injuring a domestic indus-
try. Id. During an administrative review of the determination, initiated in 1980, the ITA
submitted a questionnaire to the exporter of the merchandise without attempting to contact
the plaintiff. Id. The ITA thereafter issued a determination whose final results were identi-
cal to those made in the preliminary findings. Id. at 1379.
170 Id. at 1377-78.
171 Id. at 1379; see Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1001(a), 93 Stat.
144, 300-03 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982)) (action before the court may only be
brought by "an interested party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter
arises").
172 563 F. Supp. at 1379.
173 Id. at 1380. Since the right to judicial review accrues only after an assessment is
made, the plaintiff's protest was premature. Id.
.74 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d (1982).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982).
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under investigation. If this determination is negative, the investi-
gation is terminated. 176 If the ITC's preliminary determination is
affirmative, however, the ITA proceeds to issue a preliminary de-
termination as to whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or
suspect that the merchandise is being subsidized. 177 If the ITA's
preliminary determination is affirmative, liquidation of entries for
the merchandise is suspended from the date the determination is
published in the Federal Register, and importers are required to
post security in the amount of the estimated countervailing
duty.178 If the ITA's preliminary determination is negative, the in-
vestigation continues until the ITA makes a final determination.'79
If that final determination is affirmative, the ITC will issue a final
determination. 80 Thus, a negative ITC preliminary determination
results in a termination of the investigation, whereas, the principal
difference between an affirmative and. a negative ITA preliminary
determination is that liquidation is suspended only upon publica-
tion of an affirmative preliminary determination.
The judicial review provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 recognize these distinctions by specifically providing for judi-
cial review of negative ITC and ITA preliminary determinations.' 8 '
Since they do not mention affirmative ITA or ITC preliminary de-
terminations, a number of cases have had to address the question
of the reviewability of such determinations. Republic Steel Corp.
v. United States82 involved an ITA investigation conducted to de-
176 Id. § 1671b(b).
"I Id. § 1671b(d) (1982).
178 Id. § 1671d(a)(1).
179 Id. § 1671(b)(1).
18o Id. § 1516a(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(ii) (1982). Negative preliminary ITA determinations
presumably are reviewable because they do not result in suspension of liquidation or the
imposition of a security deposit for the payment of estimated countervailing duties. See 19
U.S.C. § 1671b(d) (1982) (liquidation suspension and duty payment requirements only ap-
plicable to affirmative preliminary determinations). This is the case despite the fact that the
existence of a preliminary affirmative ITC determination necessarily demonstrates the exis-
tence of evidence that the imported merchandise is causing injury to the domestic industry.
See id. § 1671b(b).
181 The lack of reviewability of affirmative preliminary determinations is paralleled by
the reviewability requirements concerning decisions to institute an investigation. A decision
not to institute an investigation under the antidumping or countervailing duty laws is sub-
ject to judicial review pursuant to § 516A(a)(1)(A). 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(1)(A) (1982). The
Court of International Trade indicated in National Latex Prods. Co. v. United States, 16
Cust. B. & Dec. No. 42, at 12 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 13, 1982), however, that a decision to
institute such an investigation is not subject to immediate judicial review. Id. at 15.
182 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 38 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 15, 1982).
[Vol. 58:700
§ 1581(i) JURISDICTION
termine whether a number of programs made available by the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany to producers of certain types of steel
constituted subsidies within the meaning of the countervailing
duty statute.'83 The ITA's preliminary determination was that
some of the programs appeared to constitute subsidies whereas
others did not. The plaintiffs, members of the domestic steel in-
dustry, instituted suit in the Court of International Trade to chal-
lenge the preliminary determination for failure to find that all of
the programs constituted subsidies. The United States moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the determina-
tion was "monolithic" and had to be classified as "affirmative" in
its entirety to be reviewable. Consequently, the United States ar-
gued that the plaintiffs had to await the final determination in or-
der to bring this challenge. 184
The Court denied the motion to dismiss. After observing that
the United States' argument conceded that the ITA's failure to
find that a particular program constituted a subsidy could be chal-
lenged by challenging the ITA's final determination,'85 the Court
indicated it could perceive no basis for treating final and prelimi-
nary determinations differently in this respect. Moreover, the
Court observed that distinguishing between the negative and af-
firmative portions of a single preliminary determination would be
in accord with the congressional intent to prevent damage to the
domestic industry during the period between the preliminary and
the final determinations. 186 Accordingly, the Court held that an in-
vestigation that concerned the existence of more than one subsidy
or involved more than one producer should be treated as "resulting
in a series of discrete and severable determinations.' 8 7 Therefore,
the ITA's preliminary decision that a particular program did not
constitute a subsidy was a negative preliminary determination sub-
ject to judicial review, even though the determination as a whole
183 Id. at 39.
181 See id. at 40. Affirmative preliminary determinations are not subject to immediate
judicial review. Id.; see supra note 31. Yet, a final affirmative ITA determination is subject
to judicial review if the final ITC determination is also affirmative and an order based upon
the two determinations is issued. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982); see id. § 1671d(c)(2).
8 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 40 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 15, 1982).
186 Id. Judicial review of interim administrative decisions was provided to avoid delay,
"'which could make an ultimate resolution of an issue in a party's favor irrelevant because
of the irreversible damage suffered during the interim period.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1979)).
117 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 40 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 15, 1982).
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was not.'
The Court's decision appears to be erroneous. Judicial review
of interim administrative decisions is extremely unusual, since it
disrupts the administrative process. In recognition of this fact,
Congress has stipulated that only three kinds of preliminary deter-
minations should be subject to judicial review: a decision not to
institute an investigation;'89 a negative preliminary determination
by the ITC; 90 and a negative preliminary determination by the
ITA.' 9' All of these types of negative preliminary determinations
can result in harm to domestic industry. Congress apparently was
of the view that this harm justified judicial review despite the dis-
ruption to the administrative process that would result.192 The
only effects of an affirmative ITA preliminary determination, how-
ever, are that liquidation is suspended and importers are required
to post security for estimated duties until the investigation is com-
pleted. Although these consequences also harm the importers, Con-
gress apparently did not believe that this kind of harm justified
the disruption of the administrative process that would occur if
judicial review of these interim decisions were to be available.
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Republic Steel were members of the do-
mestic industry, not importers. The only harm that the domestic
industry apparently experienced as a result of the ITA decision,
that some programs did not constitute subsidies, resulted from the
fact that the security that importers were required to post in order
to secure the payment of estimated duties may have been smaller
than it might have been had the ITA found that the programs con-
stituted subsidies.9 3 Apparently Congress did not believe that this
188 Id. In United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 21
(Ct. Int'l Trade June 28, 1983) (mem.) and United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17
Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 42 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 16, 1983), the Court extended the theory
of divisible preliminary determinations developed in Republic Steel to final countervailing
duty determinations. 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 22-23; 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 43.
These decisions relied solely Republic Steel and contained no further explanation. 17 Cust.
B. & Dec. No. 30, at 22-23; 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 43. The decisions in these two
United States Steel cases and Republic Steel were followed in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
United States, 571 F. Supp. 1265 (Ct. Int'l Trade), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
though the Court stated that the United States Steel holdings were not determinative. Id.
at 169 n.1.
188 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1)(A)(i) (1982).
190 Id. § 1516(a)(1)(A) (1982).
191 Id. § 1516(a)(1)(B)(ii).
192 See supra note 186.
,11 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(d)(2) (1982). Although the ITA must include an estimate of
the net subsidy in its determination under § 1671b(b), there is no guarantee that the esti-
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type of harm justified the disruption to the administrative process
that would result from permitting judicial review.
The decision in Republic Steel also appears to be contrary to
the principle of conservation of judicial resources, since it permits
an action to be filed before it is certain that the plaintiff will have
cause to seek relief. On the facts presented in that case, it was pos-
sible that the ITA, in reaching its final determination, would de-
cide that the programs involved constituted subsidies after all. If
this occurred, the plaintiffs would have no reason to file a claim.
Moreover, requiring the plaintiffs to await the final determination
would not necessarily mean that judicial review would be fore-
closed. According to the terms of section 516A the plaintiffs could
file suit to challenge the ITA's failure to find that certain programs
were subsidies if the ITA's final determination was negative or if
both the ITA and the ITC final determinations were affirmative
and an order was issued.
Section 516A specifies those final ITA and ITC decisions that
are subject to judicial review. 94 Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides
that either a final ITA negative determination "or" a final ITC
negative determination is subject to judicial review, while section
516a(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that final affirmative determinations by
the ITA "and" the ITC are subject to judicial review.195 Given the
use of the term "and" and the fact that section 516A(2)(A)(ii) pro-
vides that civil actions challenging these determinations must be
instituted within 30 days after the publication of an "order" based
on those determinations,' 96 it appears that section 516A authorizes
judicial review of a final affirmative ITA determination only if two
conditions are fulfilled: (1) the ITC final determination must also
be affirmative, and (2) the two final determinations result in the
issuance of an "order."
The Republic Steel holding raised the question whether a
challenge to the amount of a subsidy constituted a challenge to a
negative final ITA determination if the amount is included in a
final determination which the ITA considers to be affirmative. This
question was answered in the negative in the United States Steel
mated amount will not differ favorably from the final agreement against those required to
post the security. See id. § 1671f(a) (difference in amount disregarded if lower than the duty
imposed under the final order).
1-4 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982).
195 Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i).
"o Id. § 1516a(2)(A)(ii).
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case. 197 In these cases, the Court held that a challenge to the meth-
odology applied in a final affirmative ITA determination to calcu-
late the amount of a subsidy cannot be viewed as a challenge to a
final negative ITA determination. 19 Thus, such a methodology
must await the issuance of a final affirmative ITC determination
and the issuance of a countervailing duty order. The only explana-
tion given for this result was merely that a determination as to
amount does not present the same potential for interim injury as
did the preliminary determinations involved in Republic Steel.'99
This decision appears to be correct, not because there is a great
distinction between decisions involving the existence of a subsidy
and those involving calculation of the subsidy's amount, but be-
cause it seems clear that Congress did not intend to subject an ITA
final affirmative determination to judicial review unless the final
ITC determination was also affirmative and an order was issued.
Another question concerning the types of decisions that are
subject to judicial review arose in cases filed by the American
Spring Wire Corporation. °° In the American Spring Wire case,
the ITA issued final affirmative determinations, while the ITC is-
sued final negative determinations. 10' The plaintiff instituted sepa-
rate actions to challenge the ITA final affirmative determinations
and the ITC final negative determinations, and the United States
moved to dismiss the challenges on the ground that final ITA af-
firmative determinations may be challenged only if the final ITC
determinations are also affirmative and an order is issued. Alterna-
tively, the United States moved to suspend the challenges to the
final ITA affirmative determinations pending disposition of the
challenges to the final ITC negative determinations. The Court de-
nied the motion to dismiss but suspended the challenges to the
ITA determinations,0 2 apparently rejecting the government's
"I United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 21 (Ct.
Int'l Trade June 28, 1983) (mem.); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. &
Dec. No. 28, at 42 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 16, 1983).
198 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 22-23; 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 43.
199 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 23; 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 43.
200 American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, No. 82-8-01068 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed
Nov. 19, 1982) (suspended Mar. 24, 1983 pending disposition of action No. 83-1-00101);
American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, No. 82-11-01571 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed Aug. 2,
1982) (suspended Mar. 22, 1983 pending disposition of action No. 82-10-01355).
201 See American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1405, 1406 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984).
202 American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, No. 82-8-01068 (Ct. Int'l Trade order




To a degree, this suspension order accords with common
sense. If the challenges to the ITC negative determinations were to
fail to be sustained, the ITA affirmative determinations would be-
come irrelevant and the need to consider them would never arise.
Dismissal of the challenges to the final ITA affirmative determina-
tions, however, would have been more closely in accord with the
statute. As noted, if the challenges to the ITC determinations are
rejected, the ITA determinations would become irrelevant. In con-
trast, if the challenges to the ITC are sustained, then counter-
vailing duty orders would be issued and the plaintiff could chal-
lenge the affirmative ITA determinations, pursuant to section
516(a)(2)(B)(i), by instituting suit within 30 days after issuance of
the orders. Indeed, section 516A appears to contemplate this situa-
tion in that it permits challenges to final affirmative ITA determi-
nations to be instituted only after the issuance of an "order,"
whereas challenges to all other kinds of actions must be brought
within 30 days of the "determination. 20 3 By providing for the in-
stitution of suit after the issuance of an order, the statute prevents
a challenge to a final affirmative ITA determination from becoming
time barred in situations in which a final affirmative ITA determi-
nation is followed by a successfully challenged negative final ITC
determination. Upon reversal of the negative final ITC determina-
tion, an order will be issued, and the plaintiff may then institute
suit challenging the final ITA determination according to the stat-
utory plan. The requirement that judicial review of a final affirma-
tive ITA determination must await the issuance of an order creates
one remaining problem. Suppose that the ITA were to issue a final
affirmative determination that some manufacturers were receiving
subsidies and others were not. In making its injury determination,
the ITC considers only those manufacturers the ITA had found to
be receiving subsidies, and issues a final negative determination. A
domestic manufacturer may challenge the final negative ITC deter-
mination. What the domestic manufacturer needs to challenge is
the determination as to which manufacturers were receiving subsi-
dies. It cannot allege that the ITC failed to consider the other for-
eign manufacturers, however, because the ITC does not possess the
can Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, No. 82-11-01571 (Ct. Int'l Trade order dated March
22, 1983) (suspending action pending disposition of No. 83-1-00101).
203 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A) (1982).
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authority to determine whether these manufacturers received a
subsidy. Nor can it challenge the ITA final affirmative determina-
tion, because an ITA final affirmative determination is not subject
to judicial review unless the ITC determination is also affirmative
and an order is issued.
One possible solution to this conundrum would entail the
filing of civil actions contesting both determinations. These actions
could be consolidated on the theory that the Court's jurisdiction to
entertain the challenge to the negative ITC determination gives it
"pendent" or "ancillary" jurisdiction over the challenge to the af-
firmative ITA determination. The Court could then proceed with
the challenge to the ITA determination and, in effect, suspend the
challenge to the ITC determination until the challenge to the ITA
determination was resolved. 04 One major difficulty with this
course of action is that the plaintiff may not realize that it needs to
challenge the ITA determination until after the ITC determination
is issued. Since this may occur more than 30 days after the ITA
determination is published, it would be difficult to hold that the
Court possessed ancillary or pendent jurisdiction to entertain the
challenge.
These difficulties might be eliminated by regarding a challenge
to a final affirmative ITA determination as part of the challenge to
the negative ITC determination only in this kind of situation. An-
other possibility would be to permit a challenge to the final affirm-
ative ITA determination to be premised upon section 1581(i). Al-
though the latter solution would permit a challenge to the ITA
affirmative determination to be raised at any time within 2 years of
its publication,' 5 the doctrine of laches could be used to dismiss
any civil action challenging the final ITA determination that was
not instituted shortly after publication of the determination.
The importance of the issuance of an order is highlighted by
another set of circumstances. Section 704 of the Tariff Act autho-
rizes the ITA to enter into an agreement to eliminate or com-
pletely offset a subsidy.20 6 The ITA suspends its investigation
when it enters into such an agreement. However, if a party re-
quests the ITA to continue the investigation within 20 days of the
204 But see Melamine Chems., Inc. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 113, 115-16 (1981)
(fact that ITC investigation may proceed upon preliminary ITA finding does not make the
ITC proceedings part of the record in reviewing final ITA determination).
205 28 U.S.C. § 2636(1) (1982).
200 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)(1) (1982).
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suspension, it must do so.207 Such a continued investigation does
not result in the issuance of an order. 08 Instead, the completed
investigation has one of two effects. If the continued investigation
results in a final negative determination by either the ITA or the
ITC, the agreement will have no force or effect. If the continued
investigation results in affirmative determinations by both the ITA
and ITC, the results will be held in abeyance unless and until the
agreement is violated. If the agreement is subsequently violated,
the ITA must issue a countervailing duty order based on the re-
sults of the investigation. 09
An ITA determination to suspend an investigation on accept-
ance of an agreement is subject to judicial review pursuant to sec-
tion 516A(a)(2)(B)(iv). 210 Certain aspects of an investigation, con-
tinued on request, after acceptance of such a suspension
agreement, are likewise subject to judicial review. Since the contin-
ued investigation must be conducted as stipulated in section 705, a
resulting negative ITA determination or a negative ITC determina-
tion will be subject to judicial review according to section
516A(a)(2)(B)(ii)*11 If the continued investigation results in af-
firmative determinations by both the ITA and the ITC, however,
no order will be issued unless and until the suspension agreement
is violated. It therefore appears to follow that neither affirmative
determination alone is subject to judicial review.
These issues also arose in another group of actions brought by
the American Spring Wire Corporation.212 In those actions, the
plaintiff challenged a Commerce Department decision to enter into
a suspension agreement with the government of South Africa.213
The investigation was continued, and upon the ITA's issuance of a
final affirmative determination, the plaintiff instituted another
217 Id. § 1671c(g).
208 Id. § 1671c(f)(3)(B). Even if the conditional investigation results in affirmative final
determinations by both the ITA and the ITC, the ITA may not issue an order as long as the
agreement remains in force and continues to meet the other requirements of the section,
and the parties to the agreement carry out their obligations under its terms. Id.
20I Id. § 1671c(i)(1)(c).
210 Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv).
2" Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 704 of the Tariff Act, as amended, requires the ITA
to continue its investigation upon discovering violation of the suspension agreement, id. §
1671c(g), and issue a final determination according to § 705, see id. § 1671c(f)(A)(3).
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civil action challenging that determination.214 The United States
moved to dismiss the second action on the ground that judicial re-
view of an affirmative ITA determination, issued as the result of a
continued investigation, is available only if an order is issued, and
no order is issued unless and until the agreement is violated. The
Court denied the motion and consolidated the civil action chal-
lenging the suspension agreement with the civil action challenging
the ITA affirmative determination. 15 Thus, the Court apparently
rejected the view that no judicial review of final affirmative deter-
minations, resulting from an investigation continued under section
704 of the Tariff Act, is possible absent violation of the suspension
agreement.
A similar situation arose in actions instituted by the American
Spring Wire Corporation 16 involving a suspension agreement the
ITA had entered into with the government of Brazil.21 The inves-
tigation was continued on the request of an interested party, and
the plaintiff filed civil actions challenging the ITA's final affirma-
tive determination as well as the ITC's subsequent final negative
determination. The United States moved to dismiss the action
challenging the final affirmative ITA determination on the ground
that section 516A did not provide for judicial review of final affirm-
ative ITA determinations absent a final affirmative ITC determi-
nation and the issuance of an order based on both
214 Id.
215 Id. (order dated Mar. 22, 1983) In its order consolidating the American Spring Wire
cases, the Court cited United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 2,
at 20 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 20, 1982), without explanation. In United States Steel, interven-
ors moved to dismiss the plaintiff's challenge to the ITA's decision on the grounds that the
plaintiff could not bring such a challenge unless and until it requested a continuation of the
investigation and the investigation resulted in affirmative determinations by both the ITA
and the ITC. Id. at 17.
The court denied the motion on the same theory it had used in Republic Steel-that is,
that the harm done to domestic industry by the negative portions of the preliminary deter-
mination rendered judicial review appropriate. Id. at 17-18; see supra notes 183-188 and
accompanying text. The court noted that since the decision to enter into the suspension
agreement had terminated the suspension of liquidation, the plaintiff, a domestic manufac-
turer, was being harmed if the decision were erroneous. 17 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 2, at 17-18.
This harm, as well as the fact that the agreement could not completely offset the subsidy if
the suspension agreement were not in accordance with law, made the court unwilling to
require the plaintiff to await the results of the continued investigation in order to challenge
the decision. Id.
216 American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, No. 82-6-00881 (Ct. Int'l Trade) (con-
solidated Mar. 22, 1983).
2 See American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 73, (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983).
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determinations.218
Although the Court refused to dismiss the challenge to the
ITA affirmative determination, it suspended the action, pending
resolution of the challenge to the ITC final negative determination.
The Court apparently was of the view that the plaintiff could chal-
lenge the ITC's negative determination, since it had been issued as
the result of an investigation conducted under section 705.219 If the
negative ITC determination were to be sustained, the challenge to
the affirmative ITA determination would become moot. The Court
seemed to believe, however, that if the negative ITC determination
were to be reversed, the plaintiff should be entitled to challenge
the final ITA determination even though no order would be issued
unless and until the agreement was violated.2 By suspending the
challenge, the Court implicitly rejected the government's conten-
tion that no challenge to the affirmative determination should be
permitted. 21
The question of which determinations are subject to judicial
review was presented in a slightly different context in Smith-Co-
rona Group v. United States.222 In that case, the ITA issued an
affirmative preliminary antidumping determination, suspending
2"8 American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 566 F. Supp 1538 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983).
219 Id. (order suspending action pending resolution of American Spring Wire Corp. v.
United States, No. 83-3-00455).
220 See infra notes 238-245 and accompanying text.
22 The plaintiff in American Spring Wire had also challenged the ITA's decision to
enter into the suspension agreement with the Brazilian government. American Spring Wire
Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 73, 74 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). Once the ITC issued its
final negative determination, the government joined the intervenor's motion to dismiss the
challenge to the ITA decision upon the ground that the final negative ITC determination
rendered the agreement null and void according to § 704(f)(3)(A). Id; see 19 U.S.C. §
1671c(f)(A) (1982). The court accordingly granted the motion and dismissed the civil action
as moot. 569 F. Supp. at 75.
A potential anomaly exists under this rationale. Suppose the suspension agreement pro-
vides that the foreign government will offset any subsidy found to exist in a continued in-
vestigation. Upon continuing the investigation, the ITA determines that certain programs
do not constitute subsidies, and a domestic manufacturer seeks to challenge this determina-
tion because the foreign government is not required to offset the effect of these programs
under the agreement. A challenge to the affirmative ITA determination, however, appears to
be foreclosed because no order will be issued unless and until the agreement is violated.
This problem might be solved by requiring the domestic manufacturer to challenge the sus-
pension agreement and, in the course of that action, permitting it to challenge the portion of
the ITA's final determination that finds certain programs not to be subsidies.
222 507 F. Supp. 1015 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
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liquidation.223 Both the ITA and the ITC subsequently issued final
affirmative determinations. The ITA accordingly issued an an-
tidumping order pursuant to section 736 of the Tariff Act.224
Under the terms of section 736, the ITA must direct the Customs
Service to require importers, subject to an antidumping order, to
deposit estimated dumping duties in an amount determined by the
ITA until the actual amount of dumping duty to be imposed is
assessed.225 This requirement imposes a burden on the importer,
because the deposit the ITA requires may exceed the amount of
the duty ultimately imposed. In recognition of this fact, Congress
granted the ITA the authority to require the posting of security in
lieu of a deposit, if the ITA is satisfied that it will be able to assess
the dumping duties to within 90 days from the publication of the
order. In Smith-Corona, the ITA decided that it could make the
determination required by section 736(c) within the 90-day period
required by the statute. Accordingly, it permitted the importer to
post security instead of depositing estimated duties.226 The deter-
mination of the actual amount of dumping duties to be assessed
was made within the 90-day period, and the plaintiff instituted
suit challenging this decision. An intervenor moved to dismiss on
the ground that section 516A did not specifically provide for judi-
cial review of decisions made pursuant to section 736(c).227 The in-
tervenor recognized that section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) specifically au-
thorized judicial review of a determination of the amount of
dumping duties, but contended that section 516A did not authorize
judicial review of determinations made under section 736(c). 228
The Court denied the motion.229 Section 736(c) was viewed by
223 Id. at 1016-17.
224 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(c)(1) (1982). Section 736 also requires the ITA, within a speci-
fied period of time, to determine the actual amount of the duties to be assessed. This deter-
mination is applied to all entries that are subject to the suspension of liquidation, and
serves as a basis for estimating the amount of dumping duties to be deposited until the next
annual review. Id.
215 507 F. Supp. at 1024.
"I Id. at 1025. More precisely, the complaint challenged the foreign market value at-
tached to typewriters, which necessarily would affect the amount of duties assessed. See id.
227 Id. at 1019.
228 Id. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A) (1982) ("[w]ithin thirty days after the date
of publication in the Federal Register . . . [petitioner] may commence an action in the
United States Court of International Trade . . . contesting . . . the determination. ... )
with id. § 1673e(c) ("determination of foreign market value . . . shall be the basis for the
assessment of anti-dumping duties . . . and also shall be the basis for deposit of estimated
anti-dumping duties").
22 507 F. Supp. at 1024.
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the Court as dependent on section 751(a) for its effectiveness; the
Court reasoned that although section 736(c) served as the basis for
the liquidation a direction to assess a specific amount of dumping
duties must be issued pursuant to section 751(a).230 In effect, sec-
tion 736(c) merely provides for a "fast track" section 751(a) review.
Therefore, the section 736(c) determination was found to be re-
viewable under the provision providing for judicial review of deci-
sions under section 751(a).
This decision is correct. Indeed, no question about the result
would arise but for the fact that initially section 751(a) does not
seem to apply to the assessment of dumping duties for the period
between the first issuance of an order and the first annual re-
view. 231 Nevertheless, it is plain that Congress intended a party to
be able to obtain judicial review of such an assessment.
3. Time Within Which A Civil Action Must Be Instituted
Section 516A(a)(2)(A)(ii) requires a civil action contesting a
final affirmative ITA antidumping determination and a final ITC
antidumping determination to be instituted within 30 days of the
publication in the Federal Register of an antidumping "order"
based upon these determinations.232 The Customs Courts Act of
1980, however, provides that an action contesting a final affirma-
tive ITA determination and a final affirmative ITC determination
must be instituted within 30 days of the publication of the "deter-
mination" in the Federal Register.233 In British Steel Corp. v.
United States,3 4 the Court held that the use of the term "determi-
nation" in the Customs Courts Act of 1980 had not altered the
230 Id. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982) ("at least once during each 12-month period
. . . the administering authority" shall review and update antidumping duties) with id §
1673e(c) (allowing early antidumping determination within 90 days of publication of an-
tidumping order). Section 736(c) merely authorizes the ITA to direct the Customs Service to
assess dumping duties within a specified period of time and dictates that their amount shall
equal the difference between the foreign market value and the United States price. Id. §
1673e(c). Section 751, on the other hand, authorizes the administering authority to deter-
mine the specific foreign market value and the United States price. Id. § 1675a(2).
231 Section 751(a) provides that antidumping duty orders and other related orders must
be reviewed "at least once during each 12-month period beginning on the anniversary of the
date of publication." 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982). The reference to the 12-month period
makes it appear that § 751(a) does not apply to the first determination with respect to the
amount of duties rendered after publication of an order.
232 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
233 28 U.S.C. § 2636(c) (1982).
234 573 F. Supp. 1145 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
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meaning of the provision in section 516A.2 s6 The Court accordingly
dismissed a civil action instituted within 30 days of the publication
of a final ITA determination for lack of jurisdiction.2 36
The question of the time within which a civil action must be
instituted has also arisen in several other cases. Section 516 re-
quires a civil action contesting a final negative determination to be
instituted within 30 days of the publication of the determina-
tion.23 7 Section 516A(a)(2)(A)(ii), as noted above, requires a civil
action, challenging both a final affirmative ITA determination and
a final affirmative ITC determination, to be instituted within 30
days of the publication of the order based upon those determina-
tions. 3 8 If the negative portion of a final affirmative ITA determi-
nation is a negative determination for the purposes of judicial re-
view, according to Republic Steel and the United States Steel
cases, the question arises as to when an action challenging such
determination must be instituted. Must the action be brought
within 30 days of publication of the negative portion of the "deter-
mination," or within 30 days of publication of the "order" based
upon the ITC and ITA determinations? Apparently, the Court in
United States Steel was of the opinion that the plaintiffs pos-
sessed a choice as to when to file suit. United States Steel involved
two civil actions: one filed within 30 days of the final affirmative
ITA determination that challenged the negative portions of that
determination, and one filed within 30 days of the issuance of the
order based upon the same ITA determination and a subsequent
final affirmative ITC determination.2 39 The second complaint chal-
lenged the same negative portions of the final ITA determination
that were challenged in the first complaint. 40 Without explana-
tion, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the first complaint as
premature, and consolidated the civil actions instituted by the two
complaints.241
235 Id. at 47.
216 Id. at 49.
237 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1982).
238 Id. § 1516(a)(2)(A)(ii).
239 United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 21 (Ct.
Int'l Trade June 28, 1983) (mem.); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 17 Cust. B. &
Dec. No. 28, at 42 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 16, 1983).
240 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 21-22; 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 42.
241 See 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 30, at 23; 17 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 28, at 43-44. Each of
these actions involved two complaints. In each, the court dismissed as premature the part of
the first complaint dealing with quantification of subsidies, and consolidated the rest of that
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This "optional jurisdiction" theory was rejected by the Court
in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States.2 42 On essentially the
same facts as those presented in the United States Steel cases, the
Court dismissed the second civil action as untimely, even though it
was filed within 30 days of the publication of the order. 43 A nega-
tive portion of a final ITA affirmative determination, according to
the Court, was also a negative determination for the purpose of
determining when the statutory period for filing a civil action had
run.
244
The decision in Bethlehem Steel is correct only if Republic
Steel and its progeny are correct. If a negative portion of an af-
firmative determination is to be subject to judicial review as if it
were a negative determination, then it must be considered a nega-
tive determination for the purposes of the time within which a suit
must be instituted as well. Moreover, there appears to be no basis
for the holding in United States Steel that Congress intended to
provide plaintiffs with a choice as to when to institute suit. Con-
gress carefully established specific time limits within which a civil
action must be instituted for each of the types of decisions subject
to judicial review, and these limits should be observed. 45
D. Section 1581(d)
Section 1581(d) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of
International Trade to entertain suits challenging a decision by the
Secretary of Labor denying a request for adjustment assistance. A
complaint with the second one. Id.
242 571 F. Supp. 1265 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), rev'd and remanded, 742 F.2d 1405 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
23 571 F. Supp. at 1269. The United States did not move to dismiss the complaint that
had been filed within 30 days of publication of the order, because it believed this action to
be proper. The first action it had opposed as improper for the same reasons that it had
opposed the plaintiffs claim in Republic Steel. See id. at 1268.
2 Id. at 169. To the extent the complaint to British Steel challenged a negative aspect
of a final ITA affirmative determination, the decision in Bethlehem Steel appears to conflict
with it. This apparent inconsistency can be explained by the court's consideration of differ-
ent questions in each case. In British Steel, the court considered only the question of the
time within which a challenge to a final affirmative ITA determination must be filed; it did
not consider whether the negative aspects of the affirmative ITA determination could be
challenged as a negative determination or whether it was necessary to challenge them as
part of the entire final affirmative determination. In Bethlehem Steel, the court was primar-
ily concerned with the question of the time within which a challenge to a negative aspect of
an affirmative determination must be instituted.
'" See 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2636 (1982).
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suit challenging a decision of the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
section 1581(d) must be instituted within 60 days after notice of
the determination. 46 In Tyler v. Donovan,247 the United States
contended that the 60-day period was jurisdictional and that the
period commenced upon the date the Secretary mailed his notice
of denial of the request for adjustment assistance to the plain-
tiff.248 The United States contended that the plaintiff had not com-
menced the suit within the 60-day period and that, therefore, the
civil action should be dismissed. Without explicitly indicating its
view as to whether the 60-day period was jurisdictional, the Court
held that the 60-day period commenced upon the publication by
the Secretary in the Federal Register of a notice of denial of the
request for assistance. Since the Secretary had not published his
notice of denial in this case, the Court held that the 60-day period
had not commenced.2 49 In a subsequent case, the Court explicitly
held that a civil action pursuant to section 1581(d) was barred un-
less it was commenced within the 60-day period. A suit which is
not instituted within this period must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.2 50
E. Section 1581(f)
Section 1581(f) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of In-
ternational Trade to entertain any civil action involving an appli-
cation for an order directing the ITA or the ITC to make confiden-
tial information available to the plaintiff under section 777(c)(2) of
the Tariff Act of 1930.251 Administrative proceedings under the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws may be divided into sev-
eral stages. One stage involves the initial investigation which is
usually commenced by the filing of a petition with the ITA by a
member of a domestic industry. This investigation is concluded, if
both the ITA and the ITC final determinations are affirmative, by
the issuance of an order. The order is then subject to an annual
246 28 U.S.C. § 2336(a) (1982).
247 535 F. Supp. 691 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
248 Id. at 692.
249 Id. at 694.
250 Bruenelle v. Donovan, slip op. 82-21 (Ct. Int'l Trade March 23, 1982). The decision
in Bruenelle was followed in Waskko v. Donovan, slip op. 82-121 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 28,
1982); see also Woodrum v. Donovan, 544 F. Supp. 202, 206 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), decision
on remand, 564 F. Supp. 826 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
"I' See Monsanto Indus. Chem. Co. v. United States, slip op. 83-117 (Nov. 10, 1983).
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review pursuant to section 751. Finally, section 751 contains cer-
tain procedures which may be utilized to determine whether an or-
der should be revoked.
In In re United States International Trade Commission In-
vestigation No. AA1921-147A (Electric Golf Carts From Po-
land),2 52 plaintiff, an importer of golf carts from Poland, was a par-
ticipant in a proceeding conducted by the ITC under section 751 in
order to determine whether an antidumping order, which applied
to merchandise which plaintiff imported, should be revoked.25 3 The
proceeding had been instituted at the request of the plaintiff. In
the course of the proceeding, the plaintiff requested access to cer-
tain confidential information submitted to the ITC concerning the
price of domestic golf carts. When the ITC denied the request, the
plaintiff instituted suit alleging jurisdiction pursuant to section
1581(f) and seeking to compel the ITC to release the information.
The Court examined the language and the legislative history
of section 777(c)(2) and noted that it created a cause of action to
contest the denial of a request by the ITC for confidential informa-
tion "submitted by the petitioner or an interested party in support
of the petitioner ... 254 In the Court's view, the term "peti-
tioner" was limited to one who seeks the initiation of an antidump-
ing or countervailing duty investigation; there is no "petitioner" in
a revocation proceeding conducted pursuant to section 751. The
Court therefore held that the suit was not a suit contesting a de-
nial of access to confidential information under section 777(c)(2)
and thus dismissed the action.255
F. Section 1581(h)
Section 1581(h) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of
International Trade to entertain certain civil actions commenced
to challenge a ruling of the Treasury Secretary issued prior to the
importation of goods.256 The party filing the suit must demonstrate
to the Court that it would be "irreparably harmed" unless given an
opportunity to obtain judicial review "prior to the importation" of
the merchandise in question.257 Thus, in Bally/Midway Manufac-
252 491 F. Supp. 1356 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
25: Id. at 1357.
25' Id. at 1358.
2"' Id. at 1359.
2 6 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (1982).
27 Id.
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turing Co. v. Regan,2 58 the Court made clear that it did not possess
jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(h) if the goods involved had
already been imported. 59 Similarly, in American Air Parcel For-
warding Co. v. United States (American Air Parcel II),260 the
Court held that an "internal advice" is not a "ruling" and thus
may not be challenged pursuant to section 1581(h).261
The Court also considered the nature of the "ruling" to which
section 1581(h) refers in Pagoda Trading Co. v. United States.262
In that case, the Customs Service issued "guidelines" which were
to "aid" customs officers in classifying certain kinds of merchan-
dise. 2 3 The Court held that it did not possess jurisdiction to enter-
tain a challenge to these guidelines pursuant to section 1581(h).264
According to the Court, section 1581(h) was applicable only to
"specific contemplated import transactions which contain[ed]
identifiable merchandise and which [would] feel the impact of the
ruling with virtual certainty. 2 65 In other words, the Court indi-
cated that section 1581(h) was intended to apply to classification
disputes that ordinarily would be the subject of section 1581(a) ac-
tions were they not being "moved back in time" to the pre-impor-
tation period.266
28 565 F. Supp. 1045 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
25 Id. at 1046. Accord United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("Congress did not intend the Court of International Trade to have jurisdiction over com-
pleted transactions").
260 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 39, at 38, rev'd on reh'g, 557 F. Supp. 605 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981), a/J'd, 718 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1909 (1984).
26 See 557 F. Supp. at 608. The plaintiff distributor sought reinstatement of a Customs
Service ruling, based upon facts supplied by an internal advice request, that had been abro-
gated by a subsequent internal publication. 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 39, at 39. The Court
granted a preliminary injunction reinstating the ruling and undoing those liquidations based
upon the internal publication. Id. at 43-44. The defendant subsequently moved to dissolve
the injunction and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction under § 1581(h), 557 F. Supp.
at 605, and the Court ruled on rehearing that Congress had exempted internal advice rulings
from § 1581(h) review, id. at 608. This position comports with the legislative history of §
1581. See H. R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1980) (ruling not meant to connote
"internal advice" or "request for further review"). The appellate court did not reach these
issues, but held instead that the plaintiff had not made the showing of "irreparable harm"
required by § 1581(h). 718 F.2d at 1552.
262 577 F. Supp. 22 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
263 Id. at 23.
264 Id. at 24.
265 Id.
266 Id. Presumably, the argument that § 1581(h) was meant to cover disputes that
would come under § 1581(a) were they not moved back to the pre-importation period would
apply to valuation disputes as well. The decision in Pagoda Trading Co. is clearly in accord
with such decisions as Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 441, (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983),
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In Manufacture de Machines du Haut-Rhin v. von Raab,267
the Court explored the irreparable harm requirement of section
1581(h).268 In that case, certain firearms that the plaintiff had at-
tempted to import were detained by the Customs Service on the
ground that the merchandise allegedly infringed a trademark be-
longing to another.26 9 The importer instituted a suit seeking de-
claratory relief pursuant to section 1581(h).170
The Court held that it did not possess jurisdiction. The Court
stated that, the civil action had not been instituted prior to impor-
tation, "since the goods were detained when there was an attempt
to import them,"2 1 and since the plaintiff had merely established
that exclusion of the merchandise might result in harm to itself,
due to lost profits, loss of good will and the like, the irreparable
harm required by section 1581(h) was not established. Similarly,
the plaintiff had not demonstrated that it would experience irrepa-
rable harm "in connection with the commencement of an import
transaction," because it neither had attempted to import the goods
nor shown that importation would present any unusual or particu-
larly difficult problems. 27 2 The Court therefore concluded that
since the plaintiff had not proved that it would experience the sort
of irreparable harm that must be established to obtain injunctive
relief, it had not satisfied the requirements of section 1581(h). 3
Finally, in its opinion in American Air Parcel II, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that in order to fulfill the re-
quirement of "irreparable harm" contained in section 1581(h), a
plaintiff must demonstrate that it will experience irreparable harm
in the future. 4 Evidence of the financial burden created by past
aff'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and the appellate court's decision in United States v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982), both of which rejected attempts.to circumvent
§ 1581(a) through the use of § 1581(i). See infra notes 411-436, 446-459 and accompanying
text.
2G7 569 F. Supp. 877 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
208 Id. at 881.
209 Id. at 879.
270 Id. at 878.
2171 Id. at 880-81.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 882; see also United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(prayer for relief addressed to future importations does not constitute showing of "irrepara-
ble harm").
274 American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1909 (1984).
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transactions was held insufficient to satisfy section 1581(h).276
It is clear that section 1581(h) cannot be utilized once the
goods involved have been imported. Moreover, as the Court held in
Manufacture de Machines, the statute imposes on the plaintiff the
heavy burden of demonstrating the irreparable harm that would
result from requiring it to import its merchandise first and then
resort to traditional methods of obtaining judicial review, such as
the one set forth in section 1581(a). In the absence of these safe-
guards, importers would prefer section 1581(h) to 1581(a), since
section 1581(h) does not require payment of liquidated duties prior
to the commencement of the action. As the Court noted in Manu-
facture de Machines, this was not the result Congress intended
when it enacted section 1581(h).
G. Section 1581(i)
Section 1581(i) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of In-
ternational Trade, "in addition" to the jurisdiction conferred by
sections 1581(a)-(h), to entertain any civil action arising out of cer-
tain laws relating to international trade or the "administration and
enforcement" of those laws.2 76 This so-called "residual jurisdic-
tion" has been the subject of a number of decisions and the law in
this area remains somewhat unclear.
1. Actions That May Be Instituted Pursuant to Section 1581(i)
In S.J. Stile Associates v. Snyder,27 the plaintiff, a customs
broker, filed suit to prevent the Customs Service from altering the
method of filing entry papers in the port of New York, alleging
275 Id.
276 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1982). Section 1581(i) provides that, "in addition" to the juris-
diction granted by § 1581(a)-(h):
[T]he Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that
arises out of any law of the United States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees . . . on the importation of merchandise .. .
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of
merchandise... ;
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this section.
Id.
27 505 F. Supp. 1122 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 646 F.2d 522 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i)2 7 8 Although the Court did
not discuss the jurisdiction issue, since the existence of jurisdiction
was uncontested, this type of case is clearly within the jurisdiction
conferred upon the Court by section 1581(i).
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,2 79 the plaintiff chal-
lenged a decision to enter into settlement agreements compromis-
ing certain claims for dumping duties, made by the Secretary of
Commerce pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1617.280 The Court of Interna-
tional Trade held that it possessed section 1581(i) jurisdiction. 281
The decision was ultimately reversed on the ground that the deci-
sion to enter into the settlement agreements was committed to the
Secretary's discretion by law, and there thus was no law for the
Court to apply.282 It appears clear, however, that had there been
"law to apply," the jurisdiction holding would have been
affirmed.83
The plaintiff in Di Jub Leasing Corp. v. United States28 4 chal-
lenged the Customs Commissioner's decision revoking its custom-
shouse cartman's license.28 5 The Court held that it possessed juris-
diction to entertain the suit pursuant to sections 1581(i)(1) and
(i)(4), since the suit involved the administration and enforcement
of the federal laws providing for revenue from imports or ton-
nage.286 The primary objective of licensing and bonding cartmen,
the Court noted, "is to secure the revenue from imports on which
278 Id. at 524-25.
279 505 F. Supp. 216 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
280 Id. at 217. Zenith sought to overturn certain agreements in which the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General settled certain balances
for duties assessed against various importers. Id.
281 Id. at 218.
282 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1260 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied sub nom. 103 S. Ct. 25 (1982). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rea-
soned that the motivations and foundations for a settlement cannot be judged in terms of
ascertainable legal and factual findings. 673 F.2d at 1260. It therefore limited its review to
"determinations" made under § 516A of the Tariff Act, and consequently failed to find §
1581(c) jurisdiction on the grounds that a settlement agreement is not such a determination.
Id.
283 See, e.g., Committee to Preserve American Color Television v. United States, 706
F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.) (review appropriate when Secretary's compliance with the statutory
requirements is at issue), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 96 (1983). The court held that although a
review of the contents of the Secretary's recommendations was proscribed by Montgomery
Ward, jurisdiction could be obtained to challenge whether the Secretary's report drew upon
all relevant documents. Id. at 1578-79.
284 505 F. Supp. 1113 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
285 Id. at 1116.
286 Id. at 1117.
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customs duties have not yet been paid," so revocation of a
cartman's license pursuant to Customs Service regulations was "in-
tertwined with and directly related to the administration and en-
forcement of the laws providing for revenue from imports."287
In American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States
(American Air Parcel I),2ss the Court held that it possessed juris-
diction to entertain a civil action challenging Customs Service de-
cisions denying "immediate delivery privileges" to the plaintiff and
refusing to accept entry documentation from the plaintiff that had
been filed without certified checks. 89 In its opinion, the Court
analogized section 1581(i) to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and held that it pos-
sessed jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action, within the
meaning of sections 1581(i)(1) and (i)(4), because the case involved
the statutory and Customs Service regulations prescribing the legal
effect of the tender of uncertified checks in payment of duties.29 °
2. Actions That May Not Be Instituted Pursuant to Section
1581(i)
Section 1581(i)(1) specifically grants the Court of Interna-
tional Trade jurisdiction over civil actions arising out of any law of
the United States providing for "revenue from imports or ton-
nage."2 91 It would appear that the Court would possess jurisdiction
to entertain such an action no matter what party filed it. The
phrase "commenced against the United States," however, seems to
287 Id. (emphasis in original); see also Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United States, 546
F. Supp. 558 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), modified, 713 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Court in
Bar Bea applied the same reasoning it had employed in Di Jub to hold that it possessed
jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a decision denying plaintiff's application for a cus-
tomhouse cartage license. See id. at 53-55. The jurisdictional holdings in Di Jub and Bar
Bea were specifically approved by the Federal Circuit in United States v. Bar Bea Truck
Leasing Co., 713 F.2d 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pitman,
520 F. Supp. 1225 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981) (jurisdiction over challenge of Customs Service
refusal to accept bonds in payment of customs duties); Heraeus-Amersil, Inc. v. United
States, 515 F. Supp. 770, 772-73 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), afl'd, 671 F.2d 1356 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(jurisdiction over challenge of decision to suspend importer's privilege to suspend duty
payment).
288 515 F. Supp. 47 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
289 Id. at 50-51.
290 Id. at 50. Customs Service regulations permit the acceptance of an uncertified check
drawn on a bank in the United States or Puerto Rico as payment for customs duties. 19
C.F.R. § 24.1(a)(3) (1982). Such acceptance, however, is expressly conditioned on the filing
of a bond, the deposit of estimated duties, and the filing of summary documentation. 19
C.F.R. § 1442.13(a) (1982).
2.. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1) (1982).
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prohibit the Court from entertaining a suit by the United States
seeking to collect revenue from tonnage. The Court interpreted the
phrase in this manner in United States v. Biehl & Co.,292 although
it observed that "this unexplained, illogical, confusing and possibly
inadvertent diversion of jurisdiction over tonnage cases [to district
courts] was irreconcilable with Congress' enunciated intention" in
regard to the purpose of section 1581(i)(1). 293
The more interesting question as to what potential for overlap
exists between the jurisdiction of the district courts and that of the
Court of International Trade has arisen in the context of alleged
copyright infringement. Employing reasoning similar to that uti-
lized in DiJub and Bar Bea, the Court in Schaper Manufacturing
Co. v. Regan294 held that it possessed jurisdiction under section
1581(i) to entertain a challenge to a Customs Service refusal to
cancel certain bonds posted by the plaintiff and accept other bonds
in their place. The plaintiff was informed by the Customs Service
that an importer was attempting to import goods that appeared to
infringe copyrights the plaintiff owned.295 Customs Service regula-
tions required the plaintiff to post a bond to indemnify the im-
porter in the event that no infringement was ultimately found.296
When some of the goods turned out not to be infringing, the plain-
tiff asked the Customs Service to cancel the original bond, which
covered all of the imported merchandise, and substitute other
bonds on a model-by-model basis.297 The Customs Service denied
this request and ordered the bond previously furnished by the
plaintiff to be released to the importer, whereupon the plaintiff in-
stituted a suit challenging these decisions.2 98 The Court held that
it possessed section 1581(i) jurisdiction on the ground that the suit
was based on Customs Service regulations which served "as a co-
rollary to the acknowledged primary functions of the agency in de-
termining the proper amount of duty to be assessed upon mer-
chandise granted the right of importation. 299
292 539 F. Supp. 1218, 1220-21 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
293 Id. at 1221.
294 566 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
291 Id. at 897-98.
211 Id. at 895.
297 Id. The Customs Service advised the plaintiff that only one bond per shipment of
toys would be permitted. Id.
299 Id. at 896.
29I Id. at 898; see also Lois Jeans & Jackets U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 566 F. Supp.
1523 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). In Lois Jeans, the plaintiff imported merchandise pursuant to a
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The Court's decision in Schaper should be contrasted with its
decisions in Kidco, Inc. v. United States,300 and Bally/Midway
Manufacturing Co. v. Regan.30 1 The plaintiff, copyright owner, in
Kidco sought injunctive relief to prevent the Customs Service from
cancelling notices of redelivery it had issued to an importer of mer-
chandise that allegedly violated the plaintiff's copyright.3 0 2 The
Court held, despite the plaintiff's allegations to the contrary, that
it lacked section 1581(i) jurisdiction, since the merchandise was
not the subject of an embargo or quantitative restriction within the
meaning of section 1581(i)(3).3 03 Similarly, in Bally/Midway Man-
ufacturing Co. v. Regan, another copyright owner attempted to en-
join the cancellation of a claim for liquidated damages against an
importer for failure to redeliver merchandise that the Customs
Service had initially determined to have infringed the copyright.30 4
The Court again rejected the plaintiff's contention that the alleg-
edly piratical merchandise was the subject of an embargo or quan-
titative restriction within the meaning of section 1581(i)(3)20
The Bally, Kidco, and Schaper decisions should be contrasted
with the decision in Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States (Carling-
switch 11)206 In Carlingswitch 11, the plaintiff made a tender to
the Customs Service before a penalty notice was issued. The stat-
ute of limitations expired before the government sued to recover a
civil penalty from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff thereupon re-
quested a refund of the amount it had tendered.3 07 When the Cus-
Customs Service ruling that the merchandise did not infringe a trademark. Id. at 1525. The
Customs Service subsequently revoked the ruling and issued notices of redelivery to the
plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff protested the notices and, upon denial of the protests, instituted
suit. Id. at 1526. The Court held that it could consider the questions of whether the ruling
had been revoked in accordance with the regulations of the Customs Service and whether
the revocation had been properly applied to the plaintiff's merchandise. Id. The question of
whether the merchandise infringed the trademark was stayed, pending a decision in a dis-
trict court case instituted by the plaintiff against the trademark owner for a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement. Id. at 1528.
300 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 40, at 50 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 3, 1982).
'0' 565 F. Supp. 1045 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
302 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 40, at 50.
303 Id. at 50-51.
304 565 F. Supp. at 1046.
305 Id.
310 560 F. Supp. 46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), afl'd, 720 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
307 560 F. Supp. at 47. Since the Customs Service failed to sue for the additional tariff
assessed before the running of the statute, it was compelled to remit its entire claim. Id.
Customs maintained, however, that the plaintiff's voluntary payment had been intended to
offset part of the demanded duties and thus refused to grant a refund. Id.
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toms Service refused to comply with this demand, the plaintiff
sued to recover the money, alleging the existence of jurisdiction in
accordance with section 1581(i). After holding that section 1581(i)
did not create any new causes of action, 308 the Court considered
the plaintiff's alternative contentions that it was entitled to a re-
turn of the funds according to either 19 U.S.C. section 1618 or
principles of equitable restitution.309 The Court rejected these con-
tentions on their merits and dismissed the suit for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.310
With the possible exception of the decision in Carlingswitch
II, these decisions appear to be correct.3 11 All of the governmental
acts involved in the cases in which the Court found that it pos-
sessed jurisdiction were directly and substantially related to the
administration of the laws governing international trade, and thus
presented issues that were within the Court's special expertise.
Given the types of suits specifically identified in section 1581(i)
which come within the purview of the Court of International
Trade, it does not appear that Congress would have desired these
suits to be heard by the district courts. In contrast, the real issue
presented by Bally/Midway and Kidco was whether the imported
merchandise infringed the plaintiff's copyright and this issue was
properly determined to be within the district court's jurisdiction.31 2
"I Id. at 48-49. The plaintiff attempted to analogize § 1581(i) to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
which permits a putative federal law claim to be brought in federal court, even though no
statute specifically creates an applicable cause of action. Id. at 48.
119 Id. at 49. Section 1618 of title 19 of the United States Code authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to remit a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" upon finding that "such fine, pen-
alty, or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention . . . to
defraud the revenue or to violate the law." 19 U.S. § 1618 (1982). Alternatively, mitigation
may be obtained under this statute if the circumstances so warrant. See id.
310 Id. at 49-50; see also O'Hare Servs., Inc. v. United States, 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 17,
at 24 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 30, 1982). In the O'Hare case, the Court apparently assumed that
it possessed jurisdiction to entertain a civil action in which the plaintiff sought to recover
certain sums allegedly due as a result of the Customs Service's allegedly erroneous interpre-
tation of regulations relating to the distribution of proceeds resulting from auctions of un-
claimed merchandise. See id. at 24-25.
,, Since O'Hare Servs., Inc. v. United States, 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 17, at 24 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Mar. 30, 1982), appears to be based on the same rationale as Carlingswitch II, the
same critique would be applicable to it.
1,2 Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. Regan, 565 F. Supp., 1045, 1046 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983);
Kidco, Inc. v. United States, 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 40, at 50, 51 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 3,
1982); see also Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1983) (district court
possesses jurisdiction to order Customs Service to forfeit merchandise that infringes plain-
tiff's copyright), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (defining gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1338 (granting to district courts original jurisdiction
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The Carlingswitch II holding, that the Court possessed juris-
diction to entertain the plaintiff's claim for "equitable restitution,"
was certainly unanticipated, and probably not intended by Con-
gress, at the time the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was enacted. As
courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal courts possess only that
jurisdiction conferred on them by the federal constitution or by
Congress. 13 Thus, in a diversity case, for example, a federal court
must determine whether it possesses jurisdiction to entertain the
action before reaching the merits.1  Suits against the United
States present the additional question of whether the United
States has consented to the suit.3 15 In the absence of such consent,
the action must be dismissed, even if the court would have pos-
sessed jurisdiction had the action involved only private parties. 316
The Tucker Act317 granted the Claims Court exclusive juris-
diction to entertain non-tort claims for money damages against the
United States. 8 Since this statute contains the only consent of
the United States to suit on a claim for damages that does not
sound in tort,31 9 the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits a
over actions arising under the federal laws "relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks"). The Court specifically noted in Kidco that related litigation
involving the copyright's validity was already pending in the district court. 16 Cust. B. &
Dec. No. 40, at 51. The principal issue presented in Schaper, however, was not the validity
of the plaintiff's copyright, but the validity of certain bonding practices adopted by the
Customs Service. 566 F. Supp. at 898-99; cf. Lois Jeans & Jackets U.S.A., Inc. v. United
States, 566 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (staying decision on whether plain-
tiff's goods infringed a trademark pending decision in district court action on this issue).
33 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. South Acres Dev. Co. 434 U.S. 236, 240 (1978)
(courts must respect congressional limitation placed on district courts' original jurisdiction);
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) ("statutory law as well as
the Constitution may limit a federal court's jurisdiction"); Naartex Consulting Corp. v.
Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (presumption against diversity of citizenship exists
since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction).
31 See, e.g., Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (fail-
ure properly to allege diversity jurisdiction would justify dismissal of claim by federal
court); see Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 702 (1891) (federal courts must dismiss actions
if diversity falsely stipulated in averments because jurisdiction of federal courts is limited).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1941); United States v.
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940); Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388
(1939); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 490 (1878).
316 See e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1941); Kansas v. United
States, 204 U.S. 331, 341-343 (1907).
31 Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1508 (1982)).
3-8 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
319 Id. Another portion of the Tucker Act confers upon the district courts concurrent
jurisdiction to entertain claims for money against the United States that are not tort claims
and that do not exceed $10,000. Id. § 1346(a)(2). The jurisdiction possessed by the district
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district court from entertaining such a claim pursuant to its gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction. Even if section 1581(i) were anal-
ogous to the general federal question jurisdiction statute for some
purposes, the Tucker Act contains the only potentially applicable
consent by the United States to a suit for "equitable restitution,"
and that consent confers exclusive jurisdiction of such actions on
the Claims Court. It follows that the "equitable restitution" claim
of the plaintiff in Carlingswitch II should have been dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
It is true that in the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Congress
excluded from the Claims Court's jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act "any civil action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of International Trade." 320 This amendment, however, cannot be
construed as a consent on the part of the United States to suits in
the Court of International Trade to which it had not consented
before passage of the amendment, since a waiver of sovereign im-
munity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex-
pressed."321 When Congress has intended to waive the immunity of
the United States in regard to claims for money, it has done so by
means of explicit legislation.2 2 The limitation on the Tucker Act,
as contained in the Customs Courts Act, is not phrased affirma-
tively as a waiver of immunity to suit in the Court of International
Trade, but is phrased negatively as a mere withdrawal of the con-
sent of the United States to certain types of suits previously
brought in the Court of Claims.32 The Tucker Act is phrased in
very broad terms; a suit by an importer to obtain a refund of cus-
toms duties could conceivably be viewed as coming within its lit-
eral terms.324 Section 1581(a) makes clear, however, that the con-
court pursuant to this provision, however, is no greater than that possessed by the Claims
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
-20 Id. § 1491(b).
"2" United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); see Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S.
270, 276 (1957) (federal government's consent to suit is never implied).
322 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
32- Id. § 1491. The Tucker Act provides:
Nothing. . . shall be construed to give the United States Claims Court juris-
diction of any civil action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade . ...
Id. (emphasis added).
324 See id. The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction over actions based on acts of Congress
on the Court of Claims. Id. The specific actions withdrawn by the amendment can be found
in § 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1728, (1980)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982)).
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sent of the United States to a suit of this type only extends to the
Court of International Trade. In fact, the only purpose of the
Tucker Act amendment was to make clear that this type of suit
was governed by the consent to suit contained in section 1581(a),
therefore clarifying the demarcation between the jurisdiction of
the Court of International Trade and that of the district court.3 25
The amendment to the Tucker Act thus cannot be read as an af-
firmative consent of the United States to suit in the Court of Inter-
national Trade.
If it is followed in the future, the decision in Carlingswitch II
could have important consequences. The jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims is limited to claims founded upon a constitutional provi-
sion, a statute, a regulation, or a contract that allegedly requires
the United States to pay money to the plaintiff.32 6 In the absence
of a constitutional provision, statute, regulation, or appropriate
kind of contract, a suit against the United States for money is
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.3 27 In Carlingswitch
H, however, no constitutional provision, statute, regulation, or con-
tract required the United States to return the sum the plaintiff
had paid. Thus, had the plaintiff instituted suit in the Court of
Claims seeking "equitable restitution", the court would no doubt
have dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Nor could the
plaintiff have instituted suit in a federal district court, since the
district courts do not possess jurisdiction to entertain any non-tort
claim against the United States for an amount in excess of $10,000.
Even in those instances involving claims for a lesser amount, the
jurisdiction of the district courts is no greater than that of the
Court of Claims. Thus, even if the plaintiff in Carlingswitch H had
sought less than $10,000 in damages and commenced an action in a
district court, its action still would have been dismissed, just as it
would have been dismissed had it been instituted in the Court of
Claims. 28
325 H. R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3729, 3779.
320 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
327 E.g., United States v. Testain, 424 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1976).
3128 The Administrative Procedure Act contains a waiver of sovereign immunity, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1982), that might be applicable to an action brought pursuant to § 1581(i).
The legislative history of § 1581(i) indicates, however, that this subsection is inapplicable to
civil actions seeking to challenge a decision that ultimately will be incorporated into a deci-
sion pursuant to § 516A. See H. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3729, 3759-60. Moreover, § 704 of the Administrative
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It is clear, therefore, that a suit instituted against the United
States for "equitable restitution" would have been barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity prior to the decision in Carling-
switch II. By considering the claim of the plaintiff on the merits in
that case, the Court of International Trade appears to have consid-
erably expanded the types of monetary claims that may be as-
serted against the United States without its explicit consent.
The decision in O'Hare Services, Inc. v. United States3 9 also
possessed important jurisdictional consequences. In O'Hare Ser-
vices, the plaintiff sought to recover certain sums which it claimed
from the government due to the Customs Service's allegedly erro-
neous interpretation of regulations relating to the distribution of
proceeds from auctions of unclaimed merchandise.33 0 The Court of
Claims apparently would have possessed jurisdiction to entertain
such a suit had one been started in that court.331 The rationale of
the Court in O'Hare Services may indicate that the Court believes
that it possesses concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims
in some instances, despite the absence of an affirmative congres-
sional statement on this subject.332
H. Summary
The Court's approach to jurisdictional questions involving in-
dividual subsections of section 1581 has focused upon the purposes
Procedure Act specifically provides that "a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to reveiw on the review of the final agency
action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). Thus, the act, by its terms, does not authorize judicial review
of an agency action under the countervailing or antidumping statutes that will be incorpo-
rated into a final determination. When such an agency action does become final, it will be
subject to review as provided in § 516A, not as provided in the Administrative Procedure
Act.
329 16 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 17, at 24 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 30, 1982).
310 Id. at 24-25.
3' See id. at 24-25. The O'Hare Court dismissed the instant motion, noting that the 2-
year statute of limitations for bringing an action in the Court of International Trade had
run, see 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) (1982), even though civil actions brought against the United
States generally may be brought within 6 years of their accrual, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1982);
see 16 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 17, at 24-25. The Court construed confinement of the instant
action to a forum with a shorter statute of limitations as a withdrawal by the government of
its consent to suit. Id. at 25-26. But see Rapp v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 694, 696 (1983)
(Court of Claims action to contest Customs Service failure to deliver books plaintiff bought
at auction of unclaimed goods permitted to proceed).
3132 See 16 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 17, at 24-25. One example of a statute expressly grant-
ing concurrent jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982), which grants to the district
court jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of Claims, id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
served by the various aspects of each subsection. The Court gener-
ally has held that it possesses jurisdiction when it determines that
the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with the statutory scheme
or purposes, and has held, with few exceptions, that it lacks juris-
diction when the existence of jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with that scheme or its purposes. This conclusion is demonstrated
by the approach which the Court had adopted with respect to sec-
tion 1581(a).
A comparison of section 1581 with statutes having a similar
function will help to delineate the nature of the Court's approach.
The Federal Tort Claims Act requires a plaintiff who institutes
suit pursuant to the act to demonstrate that he has satisfied the
statutory requirement of having filed an administrative claim
before commencing the action.3 The federal courts have generally
required strict adherence to this requirement. 34 Similarly, the
Contract Disputes Act requires a contractor with a claim against
the government for an amount in excess of $50,000 to submit a
certified claim to the contracting officer before instituting suit.3 35
The Court of Claims has strictly construed this requirement.3 3 6
The Court of International Trade, however, has adopted a
slightly different approach to the jurisdictional prerequisites con-
tained in section 1581(a). The Court does ask plaintiffs bringing
suit under section 1581(a) to demonstrate that the decision being
challenged was subject to protest, that a timely protest was denied,
that the civil action was commenced in a timely fashion, and that
all duties were paid prior to the institution of the suit. Once the
Court determines that a good faith attempt has been made to sat-
isfy these prerequisites, however, literal compliance with the statu-
tory requirements is not always necessary. Instead, the Court ex-
amines the purposes of the particular requirements at issue. If the
plaintiff's actions have fulfilled these purposes, the Court generally
holds that it possesses jurisdiction. The decisions in Dynasty Foot-
.. 3 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1982).
"I See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1983) (procedural
requirements for statute that waives sovereign immunity must be adhered to strictly), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 195 (1984); House v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 573 F.2d 609, 614 (9th
Cir.) (procedural requirements are jurisdictional and cannot be waived), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 862 (1978).
41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1) (1982).
331 See, e.g., Skelly & Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414, 416-17 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Paul E.
Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 352, 356 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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wear and Eddietron furnish examples of this principle.3 37 Simi-
larly, the Court has held that certain types of decisions are subject
to judicial review, despite the absence of a specific reference to
them in the relevant statutes, because the availability of judicial
review was obviously consistent with the statutory scheme. For ex-
ample, prior to its amendment in 1970, section 514 did not include
refusal to reliquidate an entry on account of a clerical error or mis-
take of fact among the types of decisions that could form the sub-
ject of a protest.3 38 Notwithstanding this fact, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals held that a decision of this nature came
within the provision contained in that version of section 514, since
it permitted a protest to be filed against "all decisions of the...
[Customs Service] as to the rate and amount of duties
chargeable." 339
This focus upon the statutory scheme and its purposes is also
illustrated by many of the Court's decisions relating to the exis-
tence of jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(c) alone. For exam-
ple, in Smith-Corona Group, the Court held that it possessed juris-
diction to entertain a challenge to an early dumping duty decision
because it was obvious from the statutory scheme that Congress
intended to provide for the availability of judicial review.340 In con-
trast, in Nakajima All Co. v. United States,4' the Court held that
it did not possess section 1581(c) jurisdiction to entertain an inter-
venor's cross-claim challenging an antidumping determination that
would have been untimely had it been filed as a separate suit.3 42
To permit the cross-claim to be asserted in this circumstance, the
Court explained, would have circumvented the statutory time limi-
tations established for judicial review of decisions under the coun-
tervailing and antidumping statutes. 43
The concern that the Court has evinced for the need to main-
tain the integrity of each separate jurisdictional scheme contained
in section 1581 has been expressed in its approach to the relation-
37 See supra notes 100-113 and accompanying text; see also Stewart-Warner Corp. v.
United States, 577 F. Supp. 25, 25 n.1 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
3"' See 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1964).
3"' United States v. C.J. Tower & Sons, 499 F.2d 1277, 1281 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see also
Madden Mach. Co. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1294, 1297 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Lester Eng'g Co.
v. United States, 16 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 29, at 15 (Ct. Int'l Trade June 22, 1982).
110 See supra notes 222-231 and accompanying text.
"' 15 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 47, at 44 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 9, 1981).
342 Id. at 46-47.
313 Id.; see also supra notes 232-244 and accompanying text.
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ship between sections 1581(h) and 1581(a). The decisions in Amer-
ican Air Parcel II, Manufacture de Machines du Rhin, and Pa-
goda Trading Co. show that the Court has recognized that section
1581(h) contains an exception to section 1581(a). 3" Failure to con-
strue section 1581(h) strictly thus could render section 1581(a)
meaningless and thereby destroy one of the statutory schemes for
judicial review established by Congress. The Court has sought to
avoid this outcome by interpreting section 1581(h) in a manner
which prevents its use to circumvent the separate jurisdictional
scheme established by section 1581(a).
The decisions interpreting section 1581(i) in isolation show a
similar trend. Decisions such as S.J. Stile, Bar Bea Truck Leasing
Corp., and American Air Parcel I show that the Court has recog-
nized that this subsection was designed to transfer to the Court of
International Trade from the district courts jurisdiction over types
of cases that were closely related to the areas of the Customs
Court's traditional jurisdiction.345 The decisions in Bally/Midway
and Kidco illustrate, however, that the Court also has recognized
that section 1581(i) was not intended to obliterate the distinction
between the jurisdiction possessed by the district courts and that
possessed by the Court of International Trade.3 46 Moreover, it
must be emphasized that, with some notable exceptions (such as
the decisions in Alberta Gas II and the appellate decision in Amer-
ican Export Lines34 7) the Court of International Trade and the
Federal Circuit have not taken their liberal approach toward juris-
dictional requirements to the point of asserting jurisdiction where
such a holding would disrupt the scheme established by section
1581(a) and the statutes to which it makes reference.
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE
SUBSECTIONS OF SECTION 1581
As noted above, the structure of section 1581 requires the
Court to consider the separate jurisdictional schemes established
by the individual subsections of section 1581. This structure neces-
sarily requires the Court to consider the relationships between the
311 See supra notes 256-275 and accompanying text.
3' See supra notes 277-278, 284-290 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 300-05, 312 and accompanying text.
347 For opinions best exemplifying the court's interpretation of its jurisdictional statute,
see, e.g., A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Lowa, Ltd. v.
United States, 561 F. Supp. 441 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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various subsections. For example, a broad interpretation of section
1581(h) could completely deprive section 1581(a) of its indepen-
dent status, while a broad interpretation of section 1581(i) could
render all of the other subsections meaningless.
The principal difficulty the Court has encountered in inter-
preting section 1581, however, has been defining the relationship
between section 1581(a) and section 1581(i) and discerning the re-
lationship between section 1581(c) and section 1581(i). Subsections
(a), (c), and (i) are all contained in part of the statute that defines
the Court's jurisdiction. The structure of the statute suggests no
basis for according section 1581(i) greater status than that ac-
corded to any other subsection of section 1581. Section 1581(i) spe-
cifically provides that the jurisdiction it confers upon the Court is
"in addition" to that jurisdiction conferred by the other
subsections.
Given these facts, one would expect the Court to interpret sec-
tion 1581(i) in the same manner in which it has construed sections
1581(a), 1581(c), and 1581(h)-as establishing a coherent jurisdic-
tional scheme in and of itself. It likewise would be reasonable to
expect the Court to interpret section 1581(i) in a manner that
would prevent it from being used to circumvent the separate
schemes established by the other subsections of section 1581. Since
the Court has been careful to interpret section 1581(h) so as to
avoid the destruction of the statutory scheme established by sec-
tion 1581(a), it would be expected to reach a similar result when
called on to consider the relationships between sections 1581(a)
and 1581(i) or between sections 1581(c) and 1581(i).
The Court has, however, tended to view section 1581(i) differ-
ently from the other subsections of section 1581. Some courts such
as the Court in Bar Bea Leasing Co.,348 have interpreted section
1581(i) as establishing a separate jurisdictional scheme that is co-
herent in and of itself.349 Others, however, appear to accord section
1581(i) a superior status not possessed by the other subsections
contained in section 1581. This troubling trend in the case law
merits closer examination.
"' 546 F. Supp. 558 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), afl'd, 713 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
'4' Id. at 565-66; see, e.g., Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 46, 48-49
(Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 720 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1983); H. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 33, 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3729, 3745, 3760.
1984]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:700
A. The Relationship Between Section 1581(i) and Section
1581(a)
The legislative history of section 1581(i) does not indicate an
intention to create any new causes of action, and the decisions of
the Court have interpreted this section accordingly.350 However,
the exact nature of the relationship between section 1581(i) and
the other subsections contained in section 1581, particularly sub-
section (a), remained unclear. In one of its early decisions, the
Court held that it possessed jurisdiction pursuant to section
1581(i), without discussing the possibility that section 1581(i) juris-
diction did not exist because the plaintiff might have invoked ju-
risdiction pursuant to section 1581(a) but did not.351 Similarly, in
another early decision, the Court held that it possessed jurisdiction
pursuant to section 1581(i), even though it recognized that it al-
ready possessed jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(a). Finally, in
Wear Me Apparel Corp. v. United States,52 the Court viewed sec-
tion 1581(a) as merely constituting a requirement that a plaintiff
exhaust its administrative remedies before commencing suit. 53 Ac-
cording to this view, in an appropriate case the Court could dis-
pense with that requirement and assume jurisdiction pursuant to
section 1581(i).3 54
31o International Fashions v. Buchanan, 534 F. Supp. 828, 831 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981),
aff'd without opinion, 703 F.2d 584 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2119 (1983).
3"51 Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 473, 476 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1981), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 212 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In Associated Dry Goods, the Court
indicated that the roster of administrative actions it could review pursuant to § 1581(i) was
broader than the list of actions it could review pursuant to § 1581(a). Id. Merchandise that
the plaintiff attempted to import had been excluded from entry because the quota to which
it was subject had been filled. Id. at 475. The plaintiff protested the exclusion and, upon
denial of the protest, instituted a civil action challenging the President's interpretation of
the international agreement that imposed the quota. Id. at 476. The United States conceded
that the Court possessed § 1581(a) jurisdiction to review whether the Customs Service cor-
rectly applied the quota to the plaintiff's merchandise, but alleged that the President's in-
terpretation of the agreement was not subject to judicial reveiw. Id. The Court of Interna-
tional Trade disagreed, holding that it possessed jurisdiction to review the President's
determination. Id. This holding appears to have confused the question of jurisdiction with
the question of whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted. Cf. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 734, 746-47 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983) (finding "no statutory authority" to review administrative findings that formed the
basis of a presidential order and dismissing for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted), rev'd, 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
351 511 F. Supp. 814 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
"I Id. at 817.
354 Id.; cf. Grey Tool Co. v. United States, No. 83-139, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 880 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981) (dis-
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The effect of the decision in Wear Me Apparel is illustrated
by Sanho Collections, Ltd. v. Chasen.3 5 In that case, the govern-
ment reduced the quota on Korean sweaters.3 56 Due to the reduc-
tion, sweaters ordered by the plaintiff before the reduction became
effective were denied entry. Most of these sweaters were in Korea
awaiting shipment to the United States. The plaintiff filed a pro-
test against the exclusion, alleging that the quota reduction was
unlawful, and instituted suit in the Court of International Trade
before its protest had been denied. 57
The Sanho Court dismissed the portion of the civil action re-
lating to the protested entry and held, without detailed explana-
tion, that it possessed section 1581(i) jurisdiction to entertain that
portion of the complaint relating to the sweaters awaiting ship-
ment.35 8 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff possessed an admin-
istrative remedy with respect to the entry that was the subject of
the protest, and that it was "appropriate" to require the exhaus-
tion of this administrative remedy before assuming jurisdiction.3 59
The Court therefore held that the portion of the action that re-
lated to the protested entry was not "ripe" for judicial review,
since the protest had not been denied.6 With respect to the por-
tion of the action relating to the goods awaiting shipment, how-
ever, the Court held that there was "presently no protestable ad-
ministrative action pursuant to section 514 and thus no
administrative remedy."'36' The Court held that it "unquestion-
ably" possessed section 1581(i) jurisdiction "without administra-
tive review. 36 2
missing action challenging extra duties assessed against sureties because assessment did not
constitute "charges or exactions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1582(a)(3)). The Wear Me Apparel
Court did not draw such careful distinctions between the requirements of § 159(a) and those
of § 1581(i) as those drawn by the Grey Tool and St. Paul decisions between the types of
administrative decisions protestable under § 514(a) of the Tariff Act. See 511 F. Supp. at
816-17.
"1 505 F. Supp. 204 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980).
... Id. at 206.
3V Id.
8 Id. at 207-08.
3' Id. at 207.
, Id. at 207-08. One purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to ensure that cases are
presented in concrete factual situations. Id. at 208. Since the goods awaiting shipment in
Korea might conceivably be allowed entry into the United States, the portion of the action
relating to the goods awaiting shipment was even "less ripe" for judicial review than the
portion of the action that was the subject of the pending protest. Id.
"01 Id. at 207-08.
3 2 Id. at 207-08. In Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977), which
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The decision in Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States36 3 appeared to
clarify the situation. In that case, the Customs Service issued no-
tices of redelivery to an importer of rubber products on the ground
that its merchandise was not properly marked with the name of
the country of origin.3 61 Instead of filing a protest, the importer
submitted a request for internal advice as to whether the merchan-
dise came within an exception to the statute requiring the marking
of imported merchandise.3 6 5 When the Customs Service answered
this question in the negative, the importer instituted suit pursuant
to section 1581(i), seeking a declaration that the merchandise it
imported need not be marked. 6 The importer subsequently re-
quested injunctive relief to prevent the Customs Service from issu-
ing future notices of delivery.36 7
The United States moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
importer was not entitled to suit unless it first filed a protest
against the notices of redelivery and waited till the protest was de-
nied . 68 The Court denied this motion, stating that section 1581(i)
did not require the filing and denial of a protest prior to the insti-
tution of suit. As in the Wear Me Apparel decision, the Court saw
the question as one of whether or not the plaintiff should be re-
quired to exhaust its administrative remedies by filing a protest. 6 9
Although the Customs Service could have denied the request for
internal advice, once the Customs Service issued the internal ad-
was decided before the enactment of § 1581(i), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a quota could be challenged in district court. Id. at 400. In Sneaker Circus, since
the quota was enforced by the foreign government through the use of export controls, an
importer could not ship goods to this country in excess of the quota. Id. at 399. Conse-
quently, none of the importer's merchandise would be excluded from entry to the United
States, id., and no protestable decision could be made to provide the importer with access to
the Customs Court, id. at 399-400. The Sneaker Circus court therefore held that the im-
porter could challenge the quota in district court. Id. at 400. Although the Sanho quota was
enforced through the use of export controls as was the quota in Sneaker Circus, Sanho
involved a shipment that was actually excluded from entry, a fact that arguably renders the
Sneaker Circus rationale inapplicable. See 505 F. Supp. at 206.
363 529 F. Supp. 661 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), rev'd, 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
161 Id. at 662.
305 Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(H) (1982).
" 529 F. Supp. at 662.
3867 Id.
368 Id. The United States maintained that a notice of redelivery was a protestable deci-
sion under § 514(a)(4) of the Tariff Act. Id.
3'9 Id. at 662-63. The Uniroyal court determined that "the finding or denial of a pro-
test" is not necessary when the court asserts § 1581(i) jurisdiction. Id. at 663 (citing Wear
Me Apparel Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 817 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981)).
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vice the advice became binding upon it. 370 It would be futile to
require the importer to file a protest, reasoned the Court, because
the Customs Service would have no choice but to deny such pro-
test due to the internal advice. The Court therefore held that it
possessed jurisdiction under section 1581(i).3 71
The Court certified the jurisdictional question as suitable for
an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
granted leave to appeal and reversed. 3712 The appellate court as-
sumed arguendo that the notices of redelivery were not protestable
at the time they were issued,373 and viewed the question presented
as whether the importer could obtain review of the internal advice
by filing a claim under section 1581(i). 374 The court answered this
question in the negative, noting that the importer could have
raised the question of whether the merchandise came within an ex-
ception to the marking statute by filing a protest contesting assess-
ments of marking duty or liquidated damages had the Customs
Service made such assessments in response to the importer's fail-
ure to comply with the notices of redelivery.37 Since the merchan-
dise that had already been imported would be subject to protest,
the importer could not institute suit under section 1581(i) to ob-
tain review of the internal advice.37 6 According to the court, "Con-
gress did not intend the Court of International Trade to have juris-
diction over appeals when the appellant had failed to utilize an
avenue for effective protest before the Customs Service. ' '377
370 Id. at 663-64.
171 Id. at 664.
'72 United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467, 470 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
373 Id. at 472.
171 Id. at 470. The court noted that pursuant to an amendment to § 514, notices of
redelivery are specifically identified as a type of decision that may form the subject of a
protest. Id. at 469 n.5; see 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (1982).
" 687 F.2d at 471-72.
s' Id. As support for its view that Congress did not intend § 1581(i) to confer jurisdic-
tion in this type of case, the Uniroyal court noted that Congress had considered the require-
ment that a protest must be filed, and had decided to dispense with that requirement only
when the merchandise had not been imported under the circumstances specified in §
1591(h). Id. at 471 (citations omitted). The court, considering this legislative history, appar-
ently concluded that § 1581(i) could not be utilized in a case in which the merchandise had
been imported and the plaintiff could have filed, or in the future would be in a position to
file a protest. 687 F.2d at 471-72.
:17 687 F.2d at 471. With respect to the fact that the importer sought relief as to future
transactions, the court held that the importer could not institute suit pursuant to § 1581(h)
because the importer had not demonstrated the "irreparable harm" required by that section
as a prerequisite to the institution of suit. Id. at 472.
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In her concurring opinion, Judge Nies observed that the ma-
jority had characterized the case as presenting the question of
whether the importer could obtain review "of an internal ad-
vice. 13 7 8 Since, according to the legislative history of the Customs
Courts Act, an importer could never obtain review of an internal
advice, Judge Nies asserted that the Court of International Trade
actually had held that the issuance of a notice of redelivery was a
protestable decision.37 9 If that categorization of the notices was
correct, then, in this case, the notices became "final and conclu-
sive" under section 514, since the importer had not filed a protest
within the time specified.38 0 As this statutory finality requirement
could not be circumvented by instituting suit under section
1581(i), Judge Nies concluded that notices of redelivery were not
protestable3 81
Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, Judge Nies did not
view the section 514 finality provision as foreclosing all challenges
to a notice of redelivery. She noted that an importer could chal-
lenge a decision that the goods were improperly marked when and
if the Customs Service assessed either marking duties, or liqui-
dated damages, or both. Given the fact that the importer was not
foreclosed from raising the marking issue in a protest, the importer
had to do so, since section 1581(i) provides no alternative challenge
mechanism. Section 1581(i), according to Judge Nies, could not be
viewed as an "all embracing alternative" to the other remedies
contained in section 1581. Instead, section 1581(i) properly could
be utilized only if no other remedy was available or when the rem-
edies provided under the other subsections of section 1581 were
"manifestly inadequate. 38 2 Since the importer had not demon-
strated that these conditions were fulfilled, Judge Nies concluded
that the trial court did not possess jurisdiction pursuant to section
1581(i).3 83
178 Id. (Nies, J., concurring). Judge Nies noted that the review of the internal advice
issue was not addressed by the Court of International Trade. Id. (Nies, J., concurring).
379 Id. at 474 (Nies, J., concurring).
'10 Id. at 473 (Nies, J., concurring).
Id. at 475 (Nies, J., concurring).
382 Id. (Nies, J., concurring).
'81 Id. (Nies, J., concurring). Judge Nies appears to assume that if the decision to issue
a notice of redelivery could form the subject of a protest, the importer would be foreclosed
from bringing a challenge if it did not file a timely protest. See id. (Nies, J., concurring).
The concurring judge apparently believed that it was not possible to protest the notices of
redelivery, a protest against the subsequent assessment of marking duties or liquidated
[Vol. 58:700
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The "manifestly inadequate" argument used by the concurring
judge in Uniroyal derives from the decision of the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals in United States Cane Sugar Refiners'
Association v. Block."s4 In that case, an association of sugar refin-
ers challenged a presidential proclamation imposing import quotas
on sugar.38 The United States moved to dismiss on the ground
that, in order to challenge the proclamation, the association, or one
of its members, had to attempt to import sugar, file a protest in
the event of exclusion, and institute suit in the Court of Interna-
tional Trade on denial of the protest.3 86 The Court of International
Trade denied the motion, relying in large measure on its decision
in Wear Me Apparel3 87 It noted that it would be futile to require
the plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies, since the Cus-
toms Service would possess no alternative under the circumstances
outlined by the government but to deny any protest of the exclu-
sion decision. The Court therefore held that it possessed section
1581(i) jurisdiction.3 88 The appellate court affirmed, noting that it
found the lower court's exercise of section 1581(i) jurisdiction to be
proper. It was "persuaded that [since there was] potential for im-
mediate injury and irreparable harm to an industry and a substan-
tial impact on the national economy, the delay inherent in pro-
ceeding under section 1581(a) makes relief under the provision
manifestly inadequate .... 389
After the decisions in Uniroyal and United States Cane
Sugar Refiners, the Court of International Trade generally re-
quired plaintiffs to follow the procedures required to establish ju-
risdiction under section 1581(a) in the absence of a demonstration
that the remedy available under that subsection was "manifestly
inadequate." For example, in Lowa, Ltd. v. United States,390 the
damages could not address whether the marking statute had been violated or whether one of
the statutory exemptions was applicable. Id. (Nies, J., concurring). Section 514, however,
specifically provides that a protest may challenge not only a specific decision, but also the
legality of all orders and findings entering into it. 28 U.S.C. § 1514 (1982). Therefore, it
would appear that, contrary to Judge Nies's concurrence, a protest of the assessment of
marking duties could raise the question of whether the goods violated the marking statute.
384 544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
544 F. Supp. at 885.
380 Id. at 886.
87 Id. at 886-87 (citing Wear Me Apparel Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814, 817
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1981)).
"1 544 F. Supp. at 886-87.
38- 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
... 561 F. Supp. 441 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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plaintiff imported an aircraft that had been repaired abroad.3 91 On
importation, the plaintiff filed a vessel repair entry at the request
of the Customs Service, and posted a bond to cover the estimated
vessel repair duties.3 92 It was subsequently discovered that the air-
craft was not of American registry and, therefore, was not subject
to such duties. 93 The Customs Service decided, however, that the
aircraft was subject to the imposition of ordinary duties under a
tariff provision in effect at the time the aircraft was imported and
requested the importer to file new entry papers reflecting this
fact.394
The importer's new entry papers did not reflect the fact that
the aircraft was subject to duty under the tariff item in effect at
the time of its importation.3 95 Instead, the entry papers reflected
the plaintiff's contention that the aircraft was duty-free due to a
post-importation change in the law that rendered the tariff item on
which the Customs Service relied inapplicable to the type of air-
craft involved.3 96 When the Customs Service refused to accept
"' 561 F. Supp. at 442.
392 Id. at 443. The Customs Service discovered that "the aircraft was not documented
under the laws of the United States." Id.
393 Id.
I" Id. at 442.
395 Id.
396 See, e.g., Manufacture de Machines du Haut-Rhin v. von Raab, 569 F. Supp. 877,
882-83 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 899, 902
n.3 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); see also Lois Jeans & Jackets, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 17
Cust. B. & Dec., No. 23, at 22-23 (Ct. Int'l Trade May 12, 1983); Rey Cafe Coffee Co. v.
Pitman, 17 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 15, at 70-72 (Ct. Int'l Trade Mar. 23, 1983). In Lois Jeans,
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Customs Service from issuing or enforcing notices of rede-
livery, even though no protest had been filed or, of course, denied. 17 Cust. B. & Dec., No.
23, at 22. The court therefore dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 23. In Rey
Cafe, the Customs Service seized coffee imported by the plaintiff because the country of
origin did not accord with the markings on the merchandise. 17 Cust. B. & Dec., No. 15, at
70. After the Customs Service notified the plaintiff of the seizure, the plaintiff sued to enjoin
it from detaining the merchandise. Id. at 71. Since the merchandise had previously been
excluded from entry, the plaintiff could have protested the exclusion and, upon denial of the
protest, instituted a civil action pursuant to § 1581(a). The court did not dismiss the action
on this ground, however, or even discuss the possible existence of such an action; instead, it
apparently assumed that it possessed § 1581(i) jurisdiction and denied the relief requested
by the plaintiff on the merits. See id. at 72.
It is possible that the importer in Rey Cafe believed that it could not have protested
the exclusion because it had admitted that the country of origin was other than that listed
on its certificate of origin. See id. at 70. The appellate opinion in Uniroyal, however, had
specifically rejected the contention that a protest need not be filed if filing would be futile.
See 687 F.2d at 472. Alternatively, in lieu of finding that it possessed § 1581(i) jurisdiction,
the court could have held that the importer was required to await institution of a forfeiture
action in a district court by the United States.
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these entry papers, the importer filed a protest and, on denial of
the Customs Court, filed suit in the Court of International
Trade.3 97
After finding that it lacked section 1581(a) jurisdiction, the
Court considered the plaintiff's contention that jurisdiction existed
pursuant to section 1581(i).3 98 The plaintiff contended that the
Court should find that it possessed section 1581(i) jurisdiction in
view of the delay that would result in resolving the administrative
issues raised by the Customs Service, the financial loss the plaintiff
had suffered, and the fact that the issue presented was strictly a
legal issue, not a factual one. 399 The United States argued that the
plaintiff should be required to file entry papers prior to filing pro-
test, and, on denial of the protest, pay the duties and file suit pur-
suant to section 1581(a).400
The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section
1581(i)40 1 and that even though the question presented could be
viewed as "strictly legal,"40 2 invocation of section 1581(i), in this
case, "would frustrate the orderly administration of the customs
law by permitting the plaintiff to circumvent the usual and normal
administrative review process. ' 40 3 The plaintiff, noted the Court,
had "shown no statutory or judicial authority, extraordinary hard-
ship, or irreparable injury which would justify a departure from
the long settled rule" that no one is entitled to judicial relief until
the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted.
The position that section 1581(i) jurisdiction does not exist
unless the remedies provided by the other subsections of section
1581 are "manifestly inadequate" was further clarified in Ameri-
... Lowa, 561 F. Supp. at 443. The plaintiff construed the rejection of the entry papers
as a protestable decision, and, accordingly, filed a protest with the Customs Service. Id.
After Customs rejected the protest as premature, the plaintiff instituted the civil action. Id.
... Id. at 445-46. The Court determined that since the rejection of the entry papers was
not a protestable decision under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4), jurisdiction did not exist. Id.
... Id. at 447.
400 Id.
40 Id. at 448. The Court reaffirmed the principle that equitable circumstances may al-
low the Court to assume jurisdiction under § 1581(i). Id. The Court held, however, that such
circumstances did not exist in this case. Id.
402 Id. The Lowa Court also noted that part of the delay involved had been caused by
the importer's failure to indicate in its original entry papers that an aircraft was not of
American registry, and thus was not subject to the imposition of vessel repair duties. Id. at
447.
403 Id. at 447.
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can Air Parcel J1.404 In that case, an importer and its surety filed
suit to prevent the assessment of additional duties upon imported
merchandise dictated by an internal advice issued by the Customs
Service.40 5 The Customs Service subsequently revoked the internal
advice and liquidated the entries with additional duties. 40 The im-
porter filed protests but instituted suit prior to their denial, which
sought to compel the Customs Service to reinstitute its internal
advice, to prevent liquidation of further entries pending reinstitu-
tion of the internal advice, to cancel the liquidations made after
the revocation of the internal advice, and to allow all the im-
porter's protests filed on the liquidated entries.407
The trial court initially granted a preliminary injunction.40 8 In
view of the appellate decision in Uniroyal, however, the Court
granted the government's motion to dissolve the injunction and
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction,40 9 noting that "where a
litigant has access to . . .the court under traditional means, such
as [section 1581(a)], it must avail itself of this avenue of approach
complying with all the relevant prerequisites thereto. 0'41
The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal and rejected the
importer's contention that the section 1581(a) remedy was inade-
quate because the assessment of additional duties had driven it
into bankruptcy, presumably rendering it unable to meet the pay-
ment of duties requirement before instituting suit.41 1
The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the sec-
tion 1581(a) remedy was inadequate on due process grounds. Three
reasons were given to support the due process claim: the complaint
raised a constitutional question; the Customs Service regulations
built unconscionable delay into the protest and review procedure;
and procedures to safeguard the rights of the public were in-
volved.4 2 The court held, with respect to the presentation of a con-
stitutional question in the complaint, that the fact that the plain-
tiff cast its allegations in constitutional language was insufficient to
404 American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 605 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1909 (1984).
405 718 F.2d at 1548.
406 Id. at 1549.
407 Id.
408 557 F. Supp. at 606 & n.1.
409 Id.
4 10 557 F. Supp. at 606, 609.




render the remedy provided by section 1581(a) "manifestly inade-
quate." '413 If the mere presence of constitutional language in the
complaint were sufficient to establish section 1581(i) jurisdiction,
reasoned the court, every importer could circumvent section
1581(a) by phrasing its challenge in constitutional terms. Congress
could not have intended that this section be so easily circum-
vented.4" 4 The court likewise rejected the plaintiffs' allegation that
the Customs Service had "built unconscionable delays" into the
protest and review procedure.415 It noted that, by failing to utilize
the established administrative procedure for obtaining accelerated
disposition of its protests and requesting further review of a pro-
test about to be denied, the plaintiffs had delayed their own ability
to proceed under section 1581(a).416 The court found no relation-
ship between the plaintiffs' contention that "the Customs Service
must follow its own regulations which are designed to protect the
public," and the jurisdiction issue.417 Violation of a regulation,
noted the court, could be raised in a protest or in a civil action
instituted after the denial of a protest but these facts do not confer
jurisdiction.1 8
The decision in American Air Parcel 11 was followed by the
Court in American Air Parcel III.419 In that case, the plaintiffs
paid the liquidated duties upon the denial of their protest and
filed suit in the Court of International Trade.420 The plaintiffs
sought interlocutory injunctive relief to prevent the Customs Ser-
vice, pending a decision on the merits, from acting on any protests
it filed, from liquidating certain entries in a manner allegedly vio-
lative of a prior Customs Service decision, and from collecting ad-
ditional duties on other entries.42" ' The Court held that it possessed
jurisdiction only over the entry that was made the subject of the
413 Id. at 1550.
414 Id.
41 Id. at 1551.
41 Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 174.22(a)-(d) (1982) (procedure for obtaining accelerated dispo-
sition of a protest); id. § 174.23 (procedure for obtaining further review of protest).
417 718 F.2d at 1551.
418 Id.
4" American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 117, 120 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983).
420 Id. at 118.
411 Id. Although the plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies with respect
to all entries with respect to which they sought additional relief, they had paid the addi-
tional duties assessed on only one of them. Id. at 120.
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denied protest 422 and dismissed the action as to all other entries.
Since section 1581(a) was available to the plaintiffs, assumption of
jurisdiction under section 1581(i), reasoned the Court, was not
''necessary . . to avoid extraordinary and unjustified delays
caused by the exhaustion of administrative remedies."423
The legislative history of section 1581(i) demonstrates that
this provision was intended to eliminate the confusion concerning
the location of the boundary between the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts and the jurisdiction of what was then called the Cus-
toms Court.424 According to the predecessor of section 1581(a), a
plaintiff that conceivably could obtain access to the Customs Court
was required to do so; it could not circumvent the jurisdiction of
the Customs Court by commencing an action in a district court.425
Section 1581(i) was intended neither to change this body of sub-
stantive law nor to permit circumvention of section 1581(a). A
plaintiff who can obtain access to the Court of International Trade
pursuant to section 1581(a) must do so and only if it cannot do so
may it commence an action under section 1581(i).
For example, in Jerlian Watch Co. v. United States,426 the
plaintiff wished to challenge rules concerning the classification of
watches in a district court because it allegedly could not afford the
payment of liquidated duties required in order to obtain Customs
Court jurisdiction.427 The court held that since the plaintiff could
obtain access to the Customs Court it was required to do so, not-
422 Id.
423 Id. The American Air Parcel III decision suggests that the enactment of § 1581(a)
may not have altered the rule established in cases such as United States v. Boe, 543 F.2d
151 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The American Air Parcel III opinion uses a rationale similar to that
found in the Boe opinion, which was decided under the predecessor of § 1581(a). In Boe, the
government sought a writ of prohibition and mandamus to prevent the Customs Court from
extending jurisdiction over a particular civil action. 543 F.2d at 152. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals granted the writ, id. at 161, holding that since the disputed entries had
not yet been liquidated, the protests were premature, id. at 155-56, and the Customs Court
lacked jurisdiction because the "jurisdiction-conferring" requirements of the statute were
not satisfied, id. at 155, 157.
"I H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3729, 3745, 3759.
I'l E.g., Jerlian Watch Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 687, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1979) (Con-
gress intended Customs Court to have exclusive jurisdiction in customs law matters except
for narrow exception that does not include "financial impossibility"); Consumers Union Inc.
v. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872, 873-74 (D.C.
Cir.) (Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning quota limitations on
imports), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).
42 597 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1979).
4217 Id. at 689-90.
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withstanding the financial hardship that the plaintiff might suffer
as a result of meeting the payment of duties requirement.4 s As the
decisions in American Air Parcel II and American Air Parcel III
indicate, the same result should be obtained after the enactment of
section 1581(i); a plaintiff would be required to proceed in the
Court of International Trade pursuant to section 1581(a) and
would not be permitted to proceed pursuant to section 1581(i).
Similarly, in Timken Co. v. Simon,429 the court held that a plaintiff
unable to obtain access to the Customs Court, according to the
predecessor of section 1581(a), could bring an action in the district
court.430 As the decisions in Old Republic Insurance Co. and
American Air Parcel I indicate, the same result should be obtained
after the enactment of section 1581(i), except that instead of insti-
tuting suit in a district court, the plaintiff's option is to sue in the
Court of International Trade pursuant to section 1581(i).
There are good reasons for requiring a plaintiff capable of ob-
taining access to the Court pursuant to section 1581(a) to do so. A
civil action under section 1581(a) may not be instituted in the
Court of International Trade unless all liquidated duties, charges,
or exactions have been paid.43 ' If a plaintiff capable of obtaining
access to the Court, pursuant to section 1581(a), is permitted to
obtain access pursuant to section 1581(i), these revenue protection
provisions would be thwarted. Moreover, the requirement that a
plaintiff file a protest before commencement of an action may
render some actions unnecessary. For example, it is true that on
the facts presented in United States Cane Sugar Refiners, the
Customs Service could not ignore or invalidate the sugar quota at
issue. However, since it was possible that the refiners' sugar would
not be subject to the quota, or that the quota could accommodate
all of the sugar that the members of the plaintiff association de-
sired to import, the refiners should have been required to seek ac-
cess to the Court pursuant to section 1581(a). If all of their sugar
was eventually allowed entry, no civil action would have been com-
menced, and the Court would not have been required to undertake
the delicate task of determining the validity of a Presidential act.
428 Id. at 692.
429 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
410 Id. at 225. In Timken, the plaintiff's action was not protestable under § 516 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, and thus did not fulfill the prerequisites for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1582, the previous version of § 1581(a). 539 F.2d at 225-26; see 28 U.S.C. 1582(b) (1982).
4" 28 U.S.C. § 2637 (1982).
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The prerequisites to suit under section 1581(a) meet the salutary
purposes of ensuring that cases are presented in a concrete setting
and preventing the Court from having to hear cases unnecessarily,
purposes whose circumvention the Court should not permit.432
Furthermore, the Court of International Trade is a court of
limited jurisdiction, as are all federal courts. Section 1581 and the
statutes related to it, considered as a whole, represent a compre-
hensive congressional scheme that governs the Court's jurisdiction.
Thus, as the appellate court recognized in American Air Parcel II,
sections 1581(a) and 1581(i) necessarily possess different require-
ments with respect to standing, statutes of limitation, amendment
of claims, burden of proof, and standards of appellate review. 33 It
follows that the Court is not free to ignore this scheme by selecting
one jurisdictional basis over another simply because it is of the
opinion that one basis is "manifestly inadequate." Indeed, Con-
gress expressly provided that section 1581(i) jurisdiction was "in
addition" to the jurisdiction provided in the other subsections con-
tained in section 1581. Given the fact that the legislative history
expressly states that Congress did not intend section 1581(i) to be
utilized to circumvent section 1581(a),434 the phrase "in addition"
must be construed as if it provided that jurisdiction exists under
section 1581(i) only if it does not or could not exist under some
other subsection of section 1581.
Finally, the introduction of the "manifestly inadequate" con-
cept into the legislation, defining the jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade, appears to have been unwise. Section 1581(i)
was designed to eliminate confusion, not to create it. At the time
section 1581(i) became law, some plaintiffs were confused about
the difference between the jurisdiction of the district courts and
that of the Customs Court because the boundary lines defining
each were so vague. 35 Institution of suit in district court virtually
432 Cf. Sanho Collections, Ltd. v. Chasen, 505 F. Supp. 204, 207-08 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1980) (finding § 1581 (i) jurisdiction existed to review administrative action that would be-
come protestable in the future). In Sanho, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in
part due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available. Id. at
207. The Court preserved the plaintiff's challenge to the implementation of a reduced im-
port quota on sweaters that were still in their country of manufacture based on § 1581(i),
since no presently protestable administrative decision existed. Id. at 206-08.
"1 718 F.2d at 1550.
'3' See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3729, 3759.
135 See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
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became a lottery, and the plaintiff was often unable to determine
in advance whether the court would possess jurisdiction. Interjec-
tion of the "manifestly inadequate" concept into the task of deter-
mining whether section 1581(i) jurisdiction exists may not create
confusion as to the distinction between the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts and that of the Court of International Trade, but it
does blur the lines defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Inter-
national Trade. Consequently, this concept is not only likely to
generate a great deal of fruitless litigation, but it will also make
advance determinations of whether an individual plaintiff will be
able to establish jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i) nearly im-
possible, and this is the very situation Congress intended to pre-
vent by enacting section 1581(i).
1. Summary
The difficulty that the Court of International Trade has exper-
ienced in reconciling section 1581(a) and section 1581(i) is illus-
trated by the approach the Court adopted in Wear Me Apparel,
which culminated in its decisions in Sanho and Uniroyal. In those
cases, the Court apparently adopted the .view that the section
1581(a) requirement, that a plaintiff must exhaust its administra-
tive remedies, was merely discretionary, so that the Court could,
under section 1581(i), excuse the plaintiff's failure to fulfill that
requirement.
The appellate opinion in United States Cane Sugar Refiners,
which was handed down before the trial court's decision in Uni-
royal, adopted a slightly different approach. In United States
Cane Sugar Refiners, the court held that a plaintiff who could ulti-
mately institute suit pursuant to section 1581(a) could bring an ac-
tion under section 1581(i) if the relief available pursuant to section
1581(a) was "manifestly inadequate. '436 The latter approach ap-
parently has supplanted the original approach of Wear Me Ap-
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3729, 3745 & 3759.
3' United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (C.C.P.A.
1982). In speaking of the "relief" available pursuant to § 1581(a), the appellate court in
United States Cane Sugar Refiners' was apparently referring to the fact that it would have
required some time for the plaintiff to obtain access to the Court pursuant to § 1581(a), an
undesirable result since the plaintiff needed expeditious judicial resolution of its dispute
with the government. This conclusion is apparent from the court's reliance upon the ration-
ale of the opinion rendered by the Court of International Trade, see id., as well as from the
fact that the remedy available to the plaintiff pursuant to § 1581(a) was no different than
the remedy it sought when it alleged the existence of § 1581(i) jurisdiction.
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parel and its progeny.
In decisions rendered subsequent to the appellate court deci-
sions in Uniroyal and American Air Parcel II, such as Lowa and
American Air Parcel III, the Court has imposed a heavy burden
upon a plaintiff who attempted to demonstrate that the remedy
available under section 1581(a) was "manifestly inadequate." As
long as the Court relies upon this interpretation, the "manifestly
inadequate" principle is unlikely to result in decisions that differ
substantially from those that would be rendered in the absence of
the principle, except in rare instances such as that presented in
United States Cane Sugar Refiners. This principle is likely, how-
ever, to cause confusion and to generate a great deal of litigation
by plaintiffs hoping to establish section 1581(a) jurisdiction by
demonstrating that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court pur-
suant to some other subsection of section 1581 is "manifestly
inadequate."
B. The Relationship Between Section 1581(c) and Section
1581(i)
The problems the Court has experienced in defining the rela-
tionship between section 1581(c) and section 1581(i) are similar to
those it has encountered in defining the relationship between sec-
tion 1581(a) and section 1581(i). Section 1581(c) incorporates by
reference section 516A of the Tariff Act, which sets forth a com-
prehensive scheme for judicial review of agency actions made pur-
suant to the countervailing and antidumping duty laws. Again, sec-
tion 1581(i) could be used to circumvent the jurisdictional scheme
contained in section 1581(c), despite the fact that the legislative
history of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 is even more emphati-
cally opposed to this problem than it is to the use of section
1581(i) to circumvent section 1581(a).437
The relationship between sections 516A and 1581(i) was illus-
trated by Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States.411 In
Royal Business Machines, the ITC issued an antidumping order
concerning electric typewriters from Japan. 3 9 More than 30 days
after issuance of the order, the plaintiff, an importer of electric
137 E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 47, 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3745, 3759, 3759-60.
438 507 F. Supp. 1007 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 692 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
439 507 F. Supp. at 1009 & n.5.
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typewriters from Japan, brought suit in the Court of International
Trade, claiming that a particular kind of typewriter it imported
was not subject to the order.440 The plaintiff alleged the existence
of jurisdiction according to section 1581(i) and sought injunctive
relief which would have excluded the kind of typewriters the plain-
tiff imported from the purview of the antidumping order.441
The plaintiff recognized that it would be unlikely for it to be
able to establish section 1581(i) jurisdiction if its suit could have
been instituted under section 1581(c) since it had not filed the suit
within the 30-day period required by section 516A. Accordingly,
the plaintiff contended that its suit challenged the scope of the
antidumping order issued under section 736 of the Tariff Act."
Since section 516A does not address judicial review of the scope of
an order issued under section 736, the plaintiff contended that it
could not have brought an action under section 516A, and that sec-
tion 1581(i) jurisdiction therefore existed.
The Court of International Trade dismissed the suit for lack
of jurisdiction.443 The issuance of an antidumping order was purely
a ministerial act, according to the Court, in that The terms of such
an order were fixed by the results comprising the underlying deter-
minations. 4 Thus, the plaintiff's true disagreement was with the
scope of the determination that formed the basis of the order, and
not with the order itself.445 Under these circumstances, the plain-
tiff's exclusive remedy consisted of an action challenging the un-
derlying determinations. Since the plaintiff had not met the sec-
tion 516A requirement that such an action must be commenced
within 30 days of the publication of the order premised on the de-
terminations, the Court dismissed the action.446
440 Id. at 1012, 1015.
Id. at 1008-09.
442 Id. at 1015.
443 Id.
444 Id. at 1012-13.
41 Id. at 1015.
446 Id. The Court expressly noted that not every suit involving the countervailing and
antidumping duties laws must be instituted pursuant to § 516A, but held that the instant
action was not the kind of action that could be brought under § 1581(i). Id.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects including its con-
clusion that not all suits involving the countervailing and antidumping duties laws must be
brought pursuant to § 516A. 669 F.2d 692, 701, 703 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In dismissing this as-
pect of the decision below, however, the appellate court observed:
The Customs Regulations indicate that the ... factual findings and legal conclu-
sions upon which the determination is based comprise only one aspect of the de-
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The decision in Royal Business Machines should be compared
with the decision in Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v.
United States.447 In that case, certain foreign manufacturers sub-
mitted confidential information to the ITA in connection with an
antidumping investigation.44 8 The ITA, alleged the plaintiffs, de-
cided to release this information to those American manufacturers
whose petitions had caused the ITA to commence the investiga-
tion, whereupon the foreign manufacturers sued to prevent disclos-
ure of the information to their American competitors.449
The Court held that it possessed jurisdiction under section
1581(i) because the specific grants of jurisdiction found in the rest
of section 1581 did not limit the jurisdiction granted by that sub-
section.4 50 The existence of section 1581(f), which grants the Court
jurisdiction to require disclosure to a domestic producer under sec-
tion 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act, thus was not found to imply that
the Court lacked jurisdiction in a case instituted by a foreign pro-
ducer seeking to prevent disclosure to the petitioner.4 51 With re-
spect to the effect of section 516A upon section 1581(i), the Court
held that the ITA's decision to release the information was "final
and. . . independent, factually and legally, from the later determi-
nations that will be made. The correctness of this [ITA] decision
cannot be reviewed in a meaningful way in a judicial review at a
later stage of the administrative proceedings." Thus, the Court
maintained that the assumption of jurisdiction did not violate the
termination. Thus, unless there is an express factual finding or legal conclusion
with respect to the scope of the antidumping duty order . . . section 516A would
not preclude an action based on section 1581(i).
Id. at 702. The meaning of this statement is far from clear. The court appears to be saying,
however, that a suit challenging the validity of an order could be brought pursuant to §
1581(i) if the order did not contain an express factual finding or legal conclusion concerning
its scope.
Chief Judge Markey issued a concurring opinion in which he indicated that he would
not have discussed the question of whether § 1581(i) jurisdiction existed in other types of
cases. Id. at 703 (Markey, C.J., concurring).
44 542 F. Supp. 1020 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
"8 Id. at 1021-22.
49 Id. at 1022-23.
410 Id. at 1023. Title 28 of the United States Code provides the "scope and standard of
review" for the Court of International Trade. 28 U.S.C. § 2640 (1982). Subsection (d) of this
section provides that in any civil action not specified in this section, the court "shall review
the matter as provided in section 706 of title 5." Id. § 2640(d). Section 2640 thus implies
that civil actions instituted to block the disclosure of confidential information would be
reviewed in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 706. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (defining scope of
judicial review of administrative decisions).
411 542 F. Supp. at 1023.
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congressional intent that section 1581(i) not be utilized to review a
decision that will be later incorporated into a decision reviewable
under section 516A.452
Royal Business Machines and Sacilor, read together, establish
the principle that section 1581(i) should not be utilized to circum-
vent the statutory scheme established by section 1581(c) and sec-
tion 516A. As the Court indicated in Sacilor, the greatest difficulty
this principle presents arises in those cases in which a plaintiff
seeks interlocutory review of an administrative decision that is not
itself reviewable according to section 516A but that will be incor-
porated into a subsequent administrative decision specifically sub-
ject to section 516A judicial review.
This was the situation with which the Court was presented in
Haarman & Reimer Corp. v. United States.453 The Court was
called upon to interpret section 733 of the Tariff Act. Section 733
requires the ITA to make a preliminary determination as to the
existence of sales made for less than fair value within a specified
period of time.45 4 The investigation proceeds to a final determina-
tion,455 whether this determination is affirmative or negative. A
preliminary affirmative ITA determination, however, has a differ-
ent effect than a preliminary negative ITA determination, as was
discussed in a previous section. Section 733(d) requires the ITA to
order the suspension of liquidation and the posting of security for
potential antidumping duties upon the making of a preliminary af-
firmative determination.456
Such a suspension of liquidation is ordinarily effective only
with respect to entries occurring on or after the date of publication
of the preliminary determination in the Federal Register. Section
733(e) provides, however, that a petitioner may allege the existence
of "critical circumstances."4 5 If the ITA finds that critical circum-
452 Id.
45: 509 F. Supp. 1276 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
'- 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1) (1982). The ITC must make a preliminary determination as
to the existence of sales made for less than fair value within 160 days after the date on
which a petition is filed. Id. This period, however, may be extended to 210 days in "ex-
traordinary complicated cases." Id. § 1673b(c).
"I' See id. § 1673d(a) (1982) (ITC has 75 days after the sale of the preliminary determi-
nation to render final determination as to whether violation of antidumping laws exists).
This period, however, may be extended until 135 days after the preliminary determination if
a request in writing is made by either the exporter or the petitioner. Id. § 1673d(a)(2)(A)-
(B).
.. 6 Id. § 1673b(d)(1)-(2) (1982).
45' Id. § 1673b(e).
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stances exist, the suspension of liquidation resulting from a prelim-
inary affirmative ITA determination will be effective not only with
respect to entries occurring on or after the date of publication of
the preliminary determination, but also with respect to all unliqui-
dated entries occurring 90 days prior to the publication date.4 58
In Haarman & Reimer, although the plaintiff had alleged the
existence of "critical circumstances," the ITA found that no such
circumstances were present."9 The plaintiff instituted suit pursu-
ant to section 1581(i), challenging this finding.4"' The Court dis-
missed the suit for lack of jurisdiction." 1 It noted that when criti-
cal circumstances are alleged, section 735(a)(3) of the Tariff Act
requires the ITA to explain its ruling as to the existence of those
circumstances in its final affirmative determination.6 2 Such a final
determination, the Court held, was reviewable under section 516A,
but any review of the ITA determination, concerning the existence
of critical circumstances, must occur in a suit instituted pursuant
to the statutory provision authorizing judicial review of the final
determination. 46 3 The plaintiff's contention, that the mere silence
of section 516A on the question of the availability of judicial re-
view of a negative critical circumstances decision necessarily im-
plies the availability of judicial review under section 1581(i), was
expressly rejected by the Court.464 The Court indicated that it
must avoid "promot[ing] a patchwork of judicial review proceed-
ings" of administrative determinations in an antidumping investi-
gation, particularly since Congress' intent in drafting section
458 Id. § 1673b(e)(2).
4" 509 F. Supp. at 1277-78.
460 Id. at 1278. The plaintiff argued that the court should maintain jurisdiction under §
1581(i), since § 516A did not provide for a judicial review of a negative preliminary determi-
nation concerning "critical circumstances." Id.
411 Id. at 1280, 1282.
462 Id. at 1280; see 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(3) (1982) (affirmative ITA determination made
as a result of investigation in which critical circumstances are alleged should include find-
ings as to whether there is a history of dumping the kind of goods involved, whether the
importer should have known about the dumping, and whether a vast amount of the goods
were recently imported).
463 509 F. Supp. at 1280.
4164 Id. The Court discussed Lhe plaintiff's argument that § 1581(i) jurisdiction existed
because negative preliminary determinations as to "critical circumstances" are not review-
able under § 516A, but determined that this omission was consistent with Congress' intent
and was not "unintentional." Id. The Court observed that Congress did not intend prelimi-
nary affirmative or negative determinations to be reviewed; rather, judicial review was to be
"postponed until the time of the final determination." Id. (emphasis in original).
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1581(i) was to avoid this result.465
With respect to harm to the petitioner, the Court impliedly
recognized that a domestic manufacturer could be harmed by the
inability to obtain judicial review of a negative critical circum-
stances decision, because the ITA may erroneously fail to order a
retroactive suspension of liquidation in the absence of judicial re-
view. The Court noted, however, that a preliminary affirmative de-
termination that harms an importer by suspending liquidation and
requiring the posting of security is also not subject to judicial re-
view. 46 16 Thus, the fact that the plaintiff might be harmed if inter-
locutory review was foreclosed apparently was not viewed as deter-
minative of whether the Court possessed jurisdiction under section
1581(i).
The concept that interlocutory judicial review of an adminis-
trative decision is precluded when the decision at issue is incorpo-
rated into a subsequent decision specifically subjected to judicial
review by section 516A, was central to the opinion in Freres v.
United States.6 7 The plaintiff in that case challenged a final af-
firmative ITA determination, alleging that the ITA had errone-
ously refused a request to postpone its final affirmative determina-
tion in order to consider two diplomatic notes submitted by the
French government.46 '8 An intervenor moved to strike this allega-
tion from the complaint as "illusory" and immaterial.469 The Court
denied the motion, observing that the ITA's refusal to postpone its
determination was not subject to separate, interlocutory review
pursuant to section 1581(i). It therefore concluded that the chal-
lenge to the decision of the ITA, not to postpone its determination,
had been properly included in its challenge to the ITA's final
determination.470
A different approach to the relationship between section 516A
and section 1581(i) was adopted in Krupp Stahl AG v. United
States.471 In Krupp Stahl, the ITA commenced an antidumping
465 Id.
46 Id. at 1281. The court's reason for refusing to consider the possibility of plaintiff's
suffering "irreparable injury," however, was the plaintiff's failure to show that it was likely
to be able to prove the ITA's determination to be erroneous. Id. at 1281.




47, 539 F. Supp. 394 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
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investigation of products exported by the plaintiff.472 In the course
of its investigation, the ITA requested certain information from
the plaintiff. The information was provided, but the ITA refused
to consider it before making its preliminary affirmative determina-
tion, on the ground that it had not been timely submitted. The
ITA noted that it was reviewing the information for possible use in
its final determination. The plaintiff instituted suit, alleging sec-
tion 1581(i) jurisdiction, challenging the decision not to consider
the information prior to the issuance of the preliminary
determination. 473
The Court dismissed the action without prejudice.474 Although
it found that it possessed jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i),
the Court held that the case was not ripe for adjudication at the
moment.475 The Court noted that while the plaintiff had been
harmed by the preliminary affirmative determination, and the re-
sulting suspension of liquidation, this harm did not justify its in-
tervention at this stage of the proceeding. 476
A similar result was reached in PPG Industries, Inc. v. United
States.477 The plaintiff in PPG Industries requested a hearing in
accordance with section 751(d) of the Tariff Act, which requires
the ITA to provide a hearing to an interested party upon request
in the course of an annual review of an antidumping order.478 The
ITA refused on the grounds that there had been no shipments of
the merchandise subject to the order during the period covered by
the review and any determination made as a result of the annual
review would be based on information previously submitted to the
government, a fact that ITA believed would render a hearing
meaningless. 479 On the denial of its second request for a hearing,
472 Id. at 395.
473 Id.
414 Id. at 397.
'7 Id. at 395.
,71 Id. at 395-96. Although the plaintiff would have to pay estimated dumping duties on
entries as a result of the preliminary determination, the Court noted that this hardship is
"closer to the normal consequences of involvement in those investigations" than to those
hardships "which justif[y] judicial intrusion into an ongoing administrative investigation."
Id. at 396.
177 525 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
478 Id. at 884. Section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930 requires the ITA to conduct an
annual review of previously issued antidumping orders. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1982).
When such a review is conducted, the ITA must, if requested, conduct a hearing in connec-
tion with that review. 525 F. Supp. at 884; see 19 U.S.C. § 1675(f) (1982).
"1 525 F. Supp. at 884.
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the plaintiff sued according to section 1581(i), seeking a writ of
mandamus to compel the ITA to conduct a hearing.48 The Court
dismissed the action, apparently on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
481
Since the final results of the annual review were subject to review
under section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii), the Court held that the plaintiff
should await the final results of the review to seek relief. If it were
still dissatisfied at that time, it could then bring an action pursu-
ant to section 516A, alleging that the failure to grant a hearing
constituted an error that should invalidate the review results.
48 2
Similarly, in Special Commodity Group on Non-Rubber Foot-
wear from Brazil v. Baldridge,483 an importer whose merchandise
was subject to a countervailing duty order brought suit to enjoin
the ITA from completing a section 751 annual review. This plain-
tiff contended that under section 1504 of Title 19 of the U.S.C.,
every entry not liquidated with 1 year was deemed liquidated in
accordance with the entry papers submitted by the importer.
484
Liquidation of its entries, claimed the plaintiff, had been sus-
pended for more than 1 year while the ITA continued its review. 48 5
Further section 751 proceedings thus were futile, since the entries
must be deemed liquidated as entered, without regard to the ulti-
mate results of the section 751 review.4  The Court held that it
possessed section 1581(i) jurisdiction but dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.4 s7
Dismissal for this reason was warranted, asserted the Court, be-
cause the plaintiff could raise its contentions as to the effect of
section 1504 in an action challenging the final determination re-
sulting from the section 751 review, which was specifically subject
to judicial review under sections 516A and 1581(c). 411
180 Id. In addition to its demand for a hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order
to show cause, a motion for a preliminary injunction, and a motion to shorten the time
allotted to the defendants to answer the complaint. Id.
48 Id. at 884-85. The defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction and a cross-motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. Id. at 884. The Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. at
885.
482 Id. at 885.
4 575 F. Supp. 1288 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
484 Id.
... Id. at 1290 & n.2.
486 Id.
487 Id. at 1291.
488 Id. at 1292.
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The decision in Haarman & Reimer and the results in Krupp
Stahl, PPG Industries, and Special Commodity Group should be
compared with the decision in Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v.
United States. 89 In that case, the ITA issued a countervailing
duty order which, among other things, ordered the Customs Ser-
vice to demand a cash deposit to cover potential countervailing du-
ties.49 This order was to remain in effect until the first annual re-
view pursuant to section 751 was completed.91 After issuance of
the order, but before the first annual review, the foreign govern-
ment involved in the investigation eliminated some of the pro-
grams the ITA already had found to constitute subsidies.4 92 The
plaintiff then requested the ITA to reduce the deposit rate speci-
fied in its order because these programs had been eliminated.
When the ITA refused, the plaintiff commenced an action pursu-
ant to section 1581(i) to compel the ITA to reduce the deposit
rate.49' The Court held that it possessed section 1581(i) jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the decision rejecting plaintiff's request for
a reduction in the deposit rate constituted a final agency action,
which would not be incorporated into a subsequent administrative
decision reviewable under section 516A.4 94 The decision on the ju-
risdictional issue in Ceramica Regiomontana appears to be at odds
with the decisions in Royal Business Machines, Sacilor, DiJub
Leasing Corp., Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co., Haarman & Reimer,
and the results in PPG Industries, Special Commodity Group, and
Krupp Stahl.
489 557 F. Supp. 593 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
Id. at 598.
491 Id. at 599.
492 Id. at 598.
'93 Id. at 599.
9 ' Id. at 600. To determine the jurisdictional issue, the Ceramica Regiomontana Court
considered the legislative history of § 1581(i), id., which provides:
[S]ubsection (i), and in particular paragraph (4), makes it clear that the court is
not prohibited from entertaining a civil action relating to an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty proceeding so long as the action does not involve a challenge to a
determination specified in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930.
H. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3729, 3760. The court held that it had jurisdiction over plaintiff's action under §
1581(i) because the "ITA's decision was not made during any proceeding that would
culminate in a determination for which judicial review is provided under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a
and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)." 557 F. Supp. at 600 (emphasis in original). The court, however,
dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
because, in demanding that the ITA immediately reduce its deposit rate stated in the order,
the plaintiff had requested the ITA to act beyond the scope of its authority. Id. at 601.
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As the Court indicated in Haarman & Reimer, it is clear that
the mere absence of a specific provision in section 516A, providing
for judicial review of a particular administrative determination,
should not be read as an indication that section 1581(i) review is
available, given the comprehensive and detailed statutory schedule
in section 516A and the explicit congressional intent that section
1581(i) should not be utilized to disrupt this scheme. To so hold
would render the scheme contained in section 516A meaningless.
Every administrative decision relating to the countervailing and
antidumping duty laws would become subject to judicial review,
either under section 516A or under section 1581(i)-a result that
obviously would not be in accord with congressional intent. Indeed,
given the other decisions concerning the relationship between sec-
tion 1581(i) and section 516A, it could be argued that the Court
has indicated that absence of a judicial review provision in section
516A gives rise to what almost amounts to a presumption that sec-
tion 1581(i) judicial review is not available.
Moreover, as the Court also indicated in Haarman & Reimer,
the harm to the plaintiff if judicial review is not available should
not be determinative of the question whether jurisdiction exists
under section 1581(i). There may be instances, such as the refusal
to provide for judicial review of an affirmative preliminary deter-
mination, which result in a suspension of liquidation. In these in-
stances, Congress has, in effect, decided that the disruption to the
administrative process which would result from the availability of
judicial review would also outweigh any harm caused by the un-
availability of review.
Finally, the fact that judicial review of the particular adminis-
trative action at issue may never become available if immediate
judicial review is unavailable should not be determinative. Al-
though there is a general presumption in favor of judicial review,
there are some circumstances in which Congress has decided that
no judicial review should be available.
A possible approach to the problem of the relationship be-
tween section 516A and section 1581(i) is suggested by the ap-
proach adopted by the trial and appellate courts in such decisions
as the decision in Lowa. In that case, the Court was careful to
avoid a construction of section 1581(i) which would disrupt the
statutory scheme established in section 1581(a) and its related
statute, section 514.
If section 1581(i) should be construed in such a manner, as to
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avoid disruption to the statutory scheme established by sections
1581(a) and 514, it appears to follow that section 1581(i) should
also be interpreted in such a manner as to avoid any disruption to
the statutory scheme established by the Congress in sections
1581(c) and 516A. The type of approach to the relationship be-
tween section 1581(i) and sections 1581(c) and 516A suggested by
Lowa requires a careful examination of the statutory scheme estab-
lished by Congress in the antidumping and countervailing duty
statutes. Those statutes describe with great specificity the adminis-
trative decisions which are to be made, the sequence in which they
are to be issued, and the time within which they must be rendered.
Section 516A is closely related to this statutory plan. In deciding
which administrative actions should be subject to judicial review,
Congress considered such matters as the disruption to the adminis-
trative process specified in the statute which would be caused by
the availability of judicial review, the harm to particular parties
which would be caused by the fact that judicial review would not
be available, and the harm to third parties if judicial review were
to be immediately available.495 After weighing these factors, Con-
gress specifically determined that judicial review should be availa-
ble only with respect to certain administrative actions and only at
discreet stages in the administrative process. 49 s
In considering whether jurisdiction exists pursuant to section
1581(i) in a particular case, the Court should focus upon this de-
tailed statutory scheme in order to determine whether judicial re-
view would either disrupt or complement the scheme. The Court
should not hold that it possesses jurisdiction if the existence of ju-
risdiction would result in judicial review of an administrative ac-
tion that Congress did not intend to subject to judicial review, or if
it would permit judicial review at a stage in the administrative pro-
cess when Congress did not wish review to occur. In contrast, the
Court should hold that jurisdiction does exist if judicial review
would complement the statutory scheme instead of disrupting it.
The Court adopted this type of approach in decisions such as
Smith-Corona Group and British Steel Corp. when it was called
'" See Customs Courts Act of 1980; Hearings on H.R. 6394 the Subcomm. on Monopo-
lies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41
(1980) (Statement of Richard Davis, Asst. Sec'y of the Treasury for Enforcement
Operations).
"I8 See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3729, 3731.
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on to interpret section 516A in isolation. It should use this same
type of approach when it considers the relationship between sec-
tion 1581(i) and section 516A.
For example, the Court should carefully examine the com-
plaint in a particular case in order to determine whether the plain-
tiff is in reality attempting to challenge a type of decision that sec-
tion 516A requires a plaintiff to challenge within a specified period
of time. If the Court determines that this is indeed the case, the
Court should not permit the plaintiff to circumvent the time limits
established by Congress by instituting suit pursuant to section
1581(i).
Similarly, if it appears that the administrative decision that
the plaintiff seeks to challenge will be subsumed by a later decision
that is specifically subjected to judicial review by section 516A and
the alleged error in the administrative decision may serve as a ba-
sis for challenging the later decision, then the Court should hold
that the decision is not subject to immediate judicial review.4 97
This type of determination serves several purposes. It is exactly
the type of determination which the legislative history indicates
should be made,4 98 and it prevents the interposition of judicial re-
view prior to the time Congress specified that judicial review
should become available. It also prevents the unnecessary con-
sumption of judicial resources. The alleged error may be corrected
in the later decision or the plaintiff may be satisfied with the later
decision notwithstanding the existence of the alleged error.
"7 See, e.g., Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 606 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
"' See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3729, 3760 (court not prohibited from exercising jurisdiction under subsection
(i) "so long as the action does not involve a determination specified in section 516A").
In a suit for libel, if the pleadings clearly reveal the existence of a privilege, the action
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g.,
Ducosin v. Mott, 49 Or. App. 369, 371, 619 P.2d 678, 679 (1980) (absolute privilege bars
slander recovery), aff'd, 292 Or. 764, 642 P.2d 1168 (1982). A similar result would obtain if
the pleadings demonstrate that the action is barred by an affirmative defense, such as the
statute of limitations, the statute of frauds, or the doctrine of res judicata. See e.g., Mann v.
Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977) (statute of limitations); Oppen-
heimer Gateway Properties, Inc. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 494 F. Supp. 124, 125
(E.D. Mo. 1980) (statute of frauds); Hammer v. Town of Greenburgh, 440 F. Supp. 27, 28-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (res judicata), aff'd without opinion, 578 F.2d 1368 (1978); see also Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (dismissal for failure to state a claim should be granted
only when no facts entitling plaintiff to relief can be proved). In contrast, a federal court
case that is obviously moot probably should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since fed-
eral courts may only decide "cases or controversies." See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Assuming this approach is the proper standard for decision,
the opinions in Royal Business Machines and Sacilor, and the re-
sults in Krupp Stahl, PPG Industries, and Special Commodity
Group were clearly correct. For example, in Royal Business Ma-
chines, the agency action involved was certainly final and distinct.
Congress had provided two opportunities for judicial review of
such actions: one within 30 days of the order's publication, and one
upon conclusion of an annual review. The congressional intent that
the administrative process should remain undisturbed during the
period between these two opportunities for review is clear. To have
permitted the plaintiffs in Royal Business Machines to obtain ju-
dicial review when the action was first brought would have dis-
rupted this congressionally mandated period of repose. Although
the plaintiff was harmed by the fact that its merchandise was in-
cluded, perhaps erroneously, within the scope of the order, this
harm could be remedied at the conclusion of the next annual
review.
For the same reasons, it is clear that the Sacilor decision is
correct. The ITA's decision to release the confidential information
provided by the foreign producers to the American manufacturers
was clearly a final decision. Moreover, the error, if there was one,
could not have been corrected at a later stage in the proceedings.
Once the information had been disclosed, the foreign producers
would have had no recourse-the alleged confidentiality of the in-
formation would have been violated, and any challenge to its dis-
closure would have been moot. Although the availability of judicial
review would disrupt the administrative process, such disruption
would only have the effect of temporarily depriving the ITA of the
comments of the domestic industry on the information. The ITA
possessed the information and therefore could analyze it while the
litigation proceeded to a decision on the merits. Finally, the harm
to third parties, such as members of the domestic industry, caused
by the immediate availability of judicial review was relatively mi-
nor. The fact that these third parties would be deprived of the op-
portunity to submit comments pertaining to the information dur-
ing the litigation would not detract from the ITA's major function
in the proceedings. The ITA is an investigatory agency, not an ad-
judicatory body, and therefore could conduct its own analysis of
the information while the litigation proceeded.
The result reached in Krupp Stahl is also correct. Since the
ITA's failure to take certain information into account in rendering
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its preliminary determination might or might not be repeated in
the final determination, the administrative decision at issue did
not amount to a final decision to ignore the information during the
investigation. Even if this error were to have been repeated, how-
ever, the final result might still have been satisfactory to the plain-
tiff. In any event, the harm to the plaintiff caused by the suspen-
sion of liquidation and the security requirement could be
remedied, in part, upon the issuance of the final determination,
should that determination be negative. Finally, interruption of the
administrative proceedings at that stage would possibly have re-
quired complete revision of the preliminary determination, and
would have been highly disruptive.
The results in PPG Industries and Special Commodity Group
also appear to be correct. The actions the plaintiffs sought to chal-
lenge in those cases would become subject to judicial review after
the completion of the administrative process, so entertaining the
cases beforehand would have disrupted the statutory scheme pro-
viding for judicial review. It may be argued, however, that these
decisions rest on the wrong basis. As the Court noted in Special
Commodity Group, there is a distinction between dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction and dismissal for a failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. As the Court noted in American Air
Parcel I, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction relates to the power of
the court to entertain a civil action and usually does not operate as
a decision on the merits. A dismissal for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, in contrast, assumes that the court
possesses the power to adjudicate the case on the merits and also
indicates that there is some fatal bar to relief, and thus may oper-
ate as a judgment on the merits.
In PPG Industries, it was clear that the plaintiff, in challeng-
ing a subsequent decision that was specifically reviewable accord-
ing to section 516A, could raise the failure to grant a hearing
before the conclusion of the final section 751 review. Similarly, in
Special Commodity Group, the plaintiff could raise the effect of
section 1504 in a suit challenging the final results of the section
751 review, even though those results were specifically subject to
review under section 516A. The Court would acquire jurisdiction to
entertain the plaintiffs' suit on the merits at a subsequent stage in
the administrative process because the administrative decisions at
issue ultimately would be incorporated into decisions specifically
subject to judicial review. In PPG Industries and Special Coin-
1984]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
modity Group, the Court apparently viewed this potential for sub-
sequent review as a bar to the award of relief upon the merits.
It may be argued, however, that the potential for subsequent
review denied the Court the ability to entertain the cases, not
merely the ability to render a decision on the merits. The Court
previously dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, cases alleging section
1581(a) jurisdiction that had challenged kinds of Customs Service
decisions not specified in section 514. 49 The Court also considered
the question of whether a challenge to a Customs Service decision
of a kind not specified in section 514 may be entertained under
section 1581(i), and decided that section 1581(i) jurisdiction did
not exist if the plaintiff could invoke the Court's jurisdiction pur-
suant to section 1581(a) or may be able to do so in the future. °
Arguably, the same result should have been reached in PPG Indus-
tries and Special Commodity Group. In each of these cases, the
plaintiff ultimately could have raised the issue presented by invok-
ing the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(c). The legis-
lative history of section 1581(i), however, very clearly indicates
that this section was not intended to confer jurisdiction over this
type of civil action.0 1 Accordingly, the Court should have dis-
missed the suits in PPG Industries and Special Commodity Group
for lack of jurisdiction, rather on the grounds that each plaintiff
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.502
Similar reasoning shows the jurisdictional decision in Cer-
amica Regiomontana to be erroneous. Since the situation
presented therein was no different from the situation presented in
Royal Business Machines, the result should have been the same as
in that case. The statutory scheme clearly demonstrated that judi-
cial review of the deposit rate at issue in Ceramica Regiomontana
was to be available only at two stages of the administrative pro-
99 E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 673 F.2d 1254, 1260-61
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied sub nom. 103 S. Ct. 25 (1982); Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States,
560 F. Supp. 46, 48-49 (Ct. Int'l Trade), aff'd, 720 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Cheng Shin
Rubber Indus. v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 684, 686-87 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
60 The appellate court's holding in Uniroyal is an example of a decision denying sub-
section (i) jurisdiction if subsection (a) jurisdiction could be obtained. See supra notes 372-
377 and accompanying text.
5o H. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3759-60.
02 Cf. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 1145 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)




cess: on issuance of the order and on completion of an annual re-
view. Judicial review was not available in the period between those
two stages and therefore should have been denied.
1. Summary
In PPG Industries and Special Commodity Group, the Court
appeared to construe the jurisdictional scheme established by the
combination of section 1581(c) and section 516A as requiring a
plaintiff to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking
1581(i) jurisdiction. These cases apparently held that institution of
a section 1581(i) action by a plaintiff that could eventually obtain
access to the Court pursuant to section 1581(c) should be dis-
missed for failure to fulfill this exhaustion requirement. Similarly,
in Krupp Stahl, the Court dismissed a challenge to an administra-
tive action instituted pursuant to section 1581(i) for lack of "ripe-
ness," since the challenged decision would be subsequently incor-
porated into a decision specifically subject to judicial review under
sections 1581(c) and 516A.
The appellate court in Royal Business Machines appeared to
adopt a slightly different approach to the relationship between sec-
tions 1581(c) and 1581(i). In that case, the court focused on the
question of whether Congress intended to confer section 1581(i) ju-
risdiction on the Court of International Trade in situations in
which 1581(c) jurisdiction might be invoked, rather than upon the
question of whether the case was "ripe" for decision or whether the
plaintiff would be required to exhaust its administrative remedies.
With the lone exception of the decision in Ceramica Regi-
omontana, the Court has rejected every attempt to use section
1581(i) to circumvent the jurisdictional scheme established by the
combination of section 1581(c) and section 516A. This suggests
that the discussion of "ripeness" and exhaustion of remedies found
in various opinions of the Court of International Trade is only
likely to create confusion as to whether the Court will assert juris-
diction in a specific case. Consequently, such discussions are likely
to encourage futile litigation by plaintiffs hoping to convince the
Court that their cases are "ripe" for decision or that the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies would be futile.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether the Court of International Trade and the Federal
1984]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Circuit have adopted the correct approach in construing the rela-
tionship between sections 1581(a) and 1581(i) and between section
1581(c) and 1581(i) depends largely on whether they have con-
strued correctly the "in addition" phrase in section 1581(i). In this
context, the jurisdictional issue to be resolved is whether section
1581(i) applies to cases in which section 1581(i) jurisdiction is al-
leged by a plaintiff who could have invoked jurisdiction pursuant
to section 1581(a) or section 1581(c), or who may be able to do so
in the future.
If the "in addition" phrase is construed as indicating that sec-
tion 1581(i) constitutes a separate grant of jurisdiction, section
1581(i) jurisdiction will exist only when jurisdiction does not exist
or could not be invoked in accordance with one of the other sub-
sections of section 1581. Accordingly, section 1581(i) would be
viewed as totally inapplicable to the situation in which the plaintiff
could have invoked, or can eventually invoke, jurisdiction under
the terms of section 1581(a) or section 1581(c). Under this con-
struction of the phrase, Congress could not have intended to confer
jurisdiction under section 1581(i) if jurisdiction would or could ex-
ist pursuant to another subsection, since all subsections of section
1581 are of equal status. The question of whether it would be diffi-
cult or futile for the plaintiff to invoke jurisdiction pursuant to
some subsection other than subsection (i) would be totally irrele-
vant under this construction.
Conceivably, the phrase "in addition" could be construed as
conferring upon the Court jurisdiction that is supplementary to
that jurisdiction conferred by the other subsections of section 1581.
According to this approach, section 1581(i) would apply to every
situation to which the other subsections contained in section 1581
are applicable. Thus, the Court would possess discretion to excuse
a plaintiff's failure to invoke jurisdiction pursuant to some subsec-
tion other than section 1581(i). For instance, the Court could hold
that it possessed jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i) if it found
that it would be difficult or futile for a plaintiff to invoke jurisdic-
tion pursuant to section 1581(a). Under this construction, section
1581(i) would be superior in status to the other subsections of sec-
tion 1581.
Yet, there does not appear to be any support for granting sec-
tion 1581(i) superior status in the legislative history of the Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980; indeed, this view appears to be contrary
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to the intent of Congress. 03 According to decisions such as Jerlian
Watch, for example, it seems clear that a district court could not
have entertained an action such as the one involved in United
States Cane Sugar Refiners prior to enactment of the Customs
Courts Act, since the Customs Court would have possessed exclu-
sive jurisdiction pursuant to the predecessor of section 1581(a). 504
There is no indication in the legislative history of the Customs
Courts Act of 1980 that Congress intended to change this result.
Accordingly, the court should have dismissed the action in United
States Cane Sugar Refiners on the ground that the plaintiff was
required to invoke section 1581(a) before turning to section
1581(i). Instead, the court injected confusion into the law by hold-
ing that section 1581(i) jurisdiction existed because the jurisdiction
conferred by section 1581(a) was "manifestly inadequate."
The fact that sections 1581(a) and 1581(i) are part of the same
statute indicates that they are equal in status and that the differ-
ence between them should be respected. No one would suggest, for
example, that a district court should claim jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 to entertain a case that ordinarily would be insti-
tuted under the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Tucker Act be-
cause the statutory provision establishing the jurisdiction to enter-
tain a suit under one of those statutes was "manifestly
inadequate." The same principle should apply when the Court is
considering the relationship between section 1581(a) and section
1581(i) or between section 1581(c) and section 1581(i). Nonethe-
less, the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit appear to have adopted the view that the juris-
diction conferred by section 1581(i) on the Court of International
Trade is to some extent supplementary to the jurisdiction con-
101 H. REP. No. 1295, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3729, 3759-60. When the bill that became the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was consid-
ered by the House of Representatives, Representative McClory, the ranking minority mem-
ber of the subcommittee that reported the bill to the House, stated:
Simply put, subsection (i) is the embodiment of the principle that if a cause
of action involving an import transaction exists, other than as provided for in sub-
sections (a)-(h) of proposed section 1581, then that cause of action should be insti-
tuted in the U.S. Court of International Trade rather than the Federal districts
courts or courts of appeal.
126 CONG. REc. 26,554 (1980); see also H. REP. No. 1296, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3729-60 (subsection (i) not meant "to create any new
causes of action not founded on other provisions of law").
o, See supra notes 425-427 and accompanying text; see also supra note 424 and ac-
companying text.
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ferred on the Court by the other subsections of section 1581.
The implications of this approach are difficult to discern.
Cases involving the relationship between section 1581(i) and the
other subsections contained in section 1581 are relatively few in
number and the case law defining this relationship is still evolving.
No doubt a more definitive interpretation of section 1581(i) and its
relationship to the other portions of section 1581 will develop in
the future. It is to be hoped that the Court will ultimately elimi-
nate the potential for confusion that lurks in its present interpre-
tation of section 1581(i).
